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FOREWORD
The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations predicts
that space and cyberspace will become increasingly
important to joint operations and “will become both а
precursor to and integral part of armed combat in the
land, maritime and air domains.”1 How are U.S. military operations in the newest domains of space and
cyberspace being integrated with operations in the
traditional domain of land? In this monograph, Mr.
Jeffrey Caton explores various aspects of this question
by examining existing doctrine, operations in multiple
domains, and future operations. His work was completed before the April 2017 release of the U.S. Army
Field Manual (FM) 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations. He argues that the current state of military doctrine in the relatively new domains of space
and cyberspace includes adequate means to support
land-based joint operations. Further, he contends that
knowledge of the nature of these new domains is not
intuitive and understanding their unique characteristics and capabilities is still a challenge for the military
force writ large. To address some of the challenges
facing cross-domain operations, Mr. Caton provides
recommendations in the areas of domain definitions,
command relationships, and military theory. This
monograph should inform the current work of the
Army and Marine Corps in their exploration of the
multi-domain battle concept.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
vii

ENDNOTES - FOREWORD
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
September 10, 2012, p. 2.
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SUMMARY
Over the last century, the domains of air, space,
and cyberspace have joined the traditional warfighting
domains of land and sea. While the doctrine for land
operations is relatively mature, the doctrine for space
and cyberspace continue to evolve, often in an unstructured manner. This monograph examines the relationships among these domains and how they apply to
U.S. Army and joint warfighting. It concentrates on
the central question: How are U.S. military operations
in the newest domains of space and cyberspace being
integrated with operations in the traditional domain of
land? This inquiry is divided into three major sections:
• Existing Doctrine: This section explores the
current state of joint and U.S. Army doctrinal
development for each of the domains of land,
space, and cyberspace. The discussion assumes
the reader is familiar with the doctrine of land
operations, and thus it focuses more on the
newer and lesser-known domains of space and
cyberspace.
• Operations in Multiple Domains: This section
explores the concept of cross-domain synergy
and its ability to enhance globally integrated
operations. It also examines the existing processes and entities defined in doctrine that
provide expertise and support to joint force
commanders.
• Future Operations: This section explores probable future operating environments as well as
the resulting implications for U.S. Army and
joint force development. It also identifies operational challenges that cut across all domains.
It includes recommendations for policymakers
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and senior leaders regarding the future development and integration of space and cyberspace doctrine.
The scope of this monograph extends from current doctrine toward the anticipated operational environment over the next 20 years. Material considered
and presented here is limited to unclassified and open
source information; therefore, any classified discussion must occur via another venue. This monograph
provides cursory summaries and observations of over
a thousand pages of official joint and service documentation. Thus, it serves as a synopsis with analysis
of the important issues related to joint operations in
land, space, and cyberspace. This information should
allow senior policymakers, decision makers, military
leaders, and their respective staffs to gain common
understanding and professional appreciation for the
wide array of frameworks and concepts as well as their
interconnections. Of course, the reader should always
defer to the full text for details and context.
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THE LAND, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE NEXUS:
EVOLUTION OF THE OLDEST MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN THE NEWEST MILITARY
DOMAINS
Over the last century, the domains of air, space,
and cyberspace have joined the traditional warfighting
domains of land and sea. While the doctrine for land
operations is relatively mature, the doctrine for space
and cyberspace continue to evolve, often in an unstructured manner. This monograph examines the relationships among these domains and how they apply to
U.S. Army and joint warfighting. It concentrates on
the central question: How are U.S. military operations
in the newest domains of space and cyberspace being
integrated with operations in the traditional domain of
land? This inquiry is divided into three major sections:
examination of existing doctrine in the three domains;
analysis of operations in multiple domains; and analysis of the anticipated future joint operating environment (JOE) and the resulting implications for Army
and joint operations and force development.
EXISTING DOCTRINE
joint doctrine—Fundamental principles that guide
the employment of United States military forces in
coordinated action toward a common objective and
may include terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures
[emphasis added].1

In January 2012, President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta endorsed new strategic guidance for 21st-century defense priorities.
Operations in cyberspace and space were among the
10 mission areas explicitly identified for additional
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investment as the guidance asserted: “Modern armed
forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations
without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space.”2
Put simply, doctrine documents the best way to
conduct military operations based on experience of
the past, capabilities of the present, and expectations
of the future. This section explores the current state of
doctrinal development for each of the domains of land,
space, and cyberspace. First, it identifies the foundations for current joint operational doctrine. Next, it
focuses on the domain-specific joint doctrine publica
tions, and finally, it considers U.S. Army doctrine for
the domains. The discussion assumes the reader is
familiar with the doctrine of land operations, and thus
it focuses more content and details on the newer and
lesser-known domains of space and cyberspace. Let
us begin with a look at the overarching tenets of joint
doctrine.
Joint Doctrine for Operations in Traditional
Domains
Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint
forces and those Service forces employed in specified
command relationships with each other, which of
themselves do not establish joint forces [emphasis in
original].3

Military doctrine has been evolving for centuries.
During most of this time military forces consisted of
armies and navies, but within the last century U.S.
military forces have formally adopted a construct that
added three new domains—air, space, and cyberspace—to those of land and sea. With the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff following World War II,
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doctrine has become increasingly complex to address
coordinated operations in multiple domains that may
include actions from other U.S. Government entities as
well as those of other nations.4
At the top of the current doctrine hierarchy is the
capstone document Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for
the Armed Forces of the United States, which provides the
theory and foundation for subsequent doctrine publication.5 Inspired by scholars such as Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, JP 1 places joint operations within
the larger context of the nature of war that involves
many potential instruments of national power as well
as introduces the enduring principles of war and joint
functions that are covered in greater detail in capstone
publications.6 It also introduces the joint force structure
with dedicated components for land, air, maritime, and
special operations components as well as outlines command and control (C2) structures and authorities.7 As
its title implies, the final chapter of JP 1 addresses joint
force development, which includes the fundamentals
of joint concepts, doctrine, education, and training. It is
interesting to note that in JP 1 cyberspace is not listed
as a domain, but rather as part of the information environment. In fact, JP 1 refers to “physical domain(s)”
only three times, and it fails to explicitly identify these
domains in the document.8
The next level in the joint doctrine hierarchy is the
keystone publications that include JP 3-0, Joint Operations. In addition to describing the fundamentals and
art of joint operations, it devotes a chapter to the six
functions:
grouped together to help JFCs [joint force commanders]
integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations.
. . . C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver,
protection, and sustainment [emphasis in original].9
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JP 3-0 also discusses the nine enduring principles of
war identified in JP 1—objective, offensive, mass,
maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity—plus the three additional
ones of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.10 Like
JP 1, JP 3-0 lists cyberspace as part of the information
environment rather than in the list of domains, which
it specifies as “air, land, maritime, and space.”11 Potentially adding to the confusion in discussing joint operations is the fact that “domain” is not defined in joint
doctrine.
Doctrine publications comprise the final level of
the joint hierarchy and these include documents that
address the C2 for the joint operations of land, maritime, and air forces.12 These are the most mature
doctrine in terms of compiled experience, and they
each have firm foundations in military theory, such
as those of Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini for
land; Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett for maritime; and Hugh Trenchard and William
Mitchell for air. Space and cyberspace operations (CO)
each have joint publications as well, but generally lack
the benefit of developed military theory as their foundation and often devolve to technical descriptions of
their operation. Let us now examine how well space
and cyberspace are incorporated into the current doctrine for land operations.
Joint Doctrine for Operations in the Land Domain
land domain. The area of the Earth’s surface ending at
the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime
domain in the landward segment of the littorals [emphasis
in original].13
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JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations is centered on the concept of the joint force land
component commander (JFLCC) as key link between
the JFC and the C2 of joint land operations. Assigning
a JFLCC provides the JFC with “the ability to enhance
synchronization of operations not only between US
ground and component forces, but also with multinational land forces [emphasis in original].”14 The current JP 3-31 (February 2014) identifies five major forms
of land operations that the JFLCC may accomplish:
offensive, defensive, stability, homeland defense, and
defense support to civil authorities. It also discusses
how the six joint functions apply to land operations.
JP 3-31 finishes with three appendices that provide
additional details on the organization and planning of
a JFLCC.15
To tackle complex operational and threat environments, JP 3-31 states up front “commanders at
all levels should consider how space, cyberspace,
and EMS [electromagnetic spectrum] capabilities
enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land
operations.”16 Appendix I of this monograph provides verbatim excerpts of space- and cyberspace-related material contained in JP 3-31, but several items
merit discussion here. Space operations can provide
the JFLCC with “ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance]; missile tracking; launch detection;
environmental monitoring; satellite communications
[SATCOM]; position, navigation, and timing; and navigation warfare.”17 JP 3-31 emphasizes the benefits of
global positioning system (GPS) and satellite imagery
that provide valuable terrain information and personnel situational awareness for land-based operations
as well as the communications that “may provide a
critical link in the C2 architecture.”18 It is interesting
to note that the JFLCC may also serve as the space
5

coordinating authority (SCA), but would most likely
delegate this responsibility to the senior space officer
on their staff.19 The SCA will be covered in more detail
under space doctrine discussions.
With regard to CO, JP 3-31 asserts that many
advances in joint land operations “have been realized
through the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS), which has enabled the US military
and allies to communicate and reach across geographic
and geopolitical boundaries.”20 The JP advises the
JFLCC to fully integrate CO capabilities into their plans
with the purpose to “conduct CO to retain freedom of
maneuver in cyberspace, accomplish objectives, deny
freedom of action to adversaries, and enable other
operational activities.”21 The C2 for such CO is accomplished via the JFC’s Joint Cyberspace Center (JCC),
which should include a JFLCC representative. In its
chapter on operations, JP 3-31 explicitly distinguishes
between CO, information operations (IO), and communications synchronization.
The inclusion of space and CO into JFLCC doctrine
thus far appears to be appropriate, especially considering how recent the joint doctrine was introduced for
cyberspace (12 months prior) and updated for space
(8 months prior). The JFLCC notional headquarters
includes both space and cyberspace sections aligned
under the J-33 current operations. Also, the notional
joint land operation plan explicitly includes these capabilities in its annexes—appendix 16 to annex C (Operations) covers CO; annex K (Communication Systems)
includes cyberspace defense; and annex N focuses
on space operations. Finally, a cursory review of the
current doctrine for the joint force air and maritime
component commanders (joint force air component
commander via JP 3-30 and joint force maritime component commander via 3-32) reveals that they contain
6

much less detail when compared to JFLCC doctrine
with regard to how space and CO are integrated in the
other traditional domains. The joint doctrine for special operations (JP 3-05), which includes details on the
C2 accomplished by the joint force special operations
component commander’s incorporation of space and
CO, is on par with that of JP 3-31.
Joint Doctrine for Operations in the Space Domain
Space is a domain enabling many joint force-essential
capabilities. These capabilities derive from exploitation of
the unique characteristics of space, among which include
a global perspective and lack of overflight restrictions, as
well as the speed and persistence afforded by satellites.22

JP 3-14, Space Operations was first released in August
2002, and it addressed space operations focused on
the combatant command (CCMD) of U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) that was established in 1985.
Ironically, after 17 years of waiting for joint space
doctrine, large portions of JP 3-14 were obsolete only
months later when USSPACECOM was disestablished
and its missions moved under the new U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) under changes mandated
by the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).23 JP 3-14
was updated in 2009 to reflect the new organization of
space forces under USSTRATCOM and updated to its
current version in May 2013.
From the start, the JP 3-14 portrays space as a domain
to support operations in the terrestrial domains, noting,
“space capabilities have proven to be significant force
multipliers when integrated into military operations
[emphasis added].”24 It emphasizes that space capabilities are sought by friendly nations and adversaries as
well as commercial entities, making the space domain
a “congested, contested, and competitive environment.”25 JP 3-14 asserts four unique characteristics of
7

the space domain: no geographical boundaries; orbital
mechanics; environmental considerations of space
weather and orbital debris; and EMS dependency.
While it claims “international law does not extend a
nation’s territorial sovereignty up to Earth orbit,” JP
3-14 also includes a section on critical legal considerations regarding obligations to international law for
U.S. space operations.26 However, the publication does
not mention the crucial role of the United Nation’s
(UN) International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in
allocating SATCOM orbits and radio spectrum.27
The current JP 3-14 identifies five joint space mission areas: space situational awareness (added in this
revision); space force enhancement; space support;
space control; and space force application. The mission of space force enhancement provides the most
direct benefits to forces in other domains by providing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; missile
tracking; launch detection; environmental monitoring;
SATCOM; positioning, navigation, and timing; and
navigation warfare.28 Since the 2002 UCP change, joint
space operations are conducted by USSTRATCOM,
with the bulk of daily activities managed by the Joint
Functional Component Commander for Space (JFCC
SPACE), who provides “unity of command and unity
of effort in the unimpeded delivery of joint space capabilities to supported commanders and, when directed,
to deny the benefits of space to adversaries.”29 Two
other authorities of interest in JP 3-14 are the designation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as the
supported command for SATCOM and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) as the only authorized
provider of SATCOM for the Department of Defense
(DoD).30

8

For joint operations, the space coordinating
authority (SCA) has the responsibility for planning
and integrating space capabilities. The SCA may be
delegated to the JFC for a specific operation who in
turn may designate a component command or other
individual to serve as the SCA.31 For land operations,
JP 3-14 states that the U.S. Army integrates space capabilities into their units using space support elements
(SSEs), which coordinate with the SCA.32 All space
operations integration into joint planning includes
the use of Annex N of a standard operational plan to
describe space forces and capabilities relevant to the
specific nature of the plan. JP 3-14 emphasizes that
planners need to grasp the high-demand/low-density
nature of some space capabilities as well as the challenges of space force augmentation or reconstitution.33
To provide overt connections to the joint tenets,
JP 3-14 includes an overview of the 12 principles of
joint operations from the perspectives of employing
and enabling operations in the space domain, offering examples but no in-depth discussion.34 Finally, to
improve awareness of these limited resources, almost
one-third of JP 3-14 is in the form of appendices that
provide further detail into certain space capabilities as
well as the technical “rocket science” nature of space
operations.35
Although it got off to a slow start, the publication
of joint space doctrine has evolved steadily since its
introduction in 2002. However, there is still no widely
accepted theory for military space operations and no
definition for the space domain codified in joint doctrine. Both of these situations will be addressed in
more detail later in this monograph.
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Joint Doctrine for Operations in the Cyberspace
Domain
cyberspace. A global domain within the information
environment consisting of the interdependent networks
of information technology infrastructures and resident
data, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors
and controllers [emphasis in original].36

Although military operations in cyberspace have
been occurring for decades, it was not until 2010 that
the DoD publicly codified cyberspace “as relevant a
[man-made] domain for DoD activities as the naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air, and space.”37
In July 2011, this pronouncement was further clarified as the inaugural DoD cyberspace strategy made
its first of five strategic initiatives to “treat cyberspace
as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip
so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s
potential.”38 This strategy followed 6 months after the
establishment of the initial operational capability of
USCYBERCOM.
Initially released in February 2013 as a secret document, JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations was published in
its current unclassified format as JP 3-12 (R) in October
2014.39 The publication establishes a conceptual framework of cyberspace as three layers: a physical network
layer that enables a logical network layer upon which
operations are initiated by entities in the cyber-persona
layer.40 The intent of CO is to:
enhance operational effectiveness and leverage various
capabilities from physical domains to create effects, which
may span multiple geographic combatant commanders’
(GCCs’) AOR [area of responsibility].41
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As with space operations, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM), has overall
responsibility for CO, most of which are carried out
by the sub-unified USCYBERCOM. The JP identifies three types of CO missions: offensive CO (OCO),
defensive CO (DCO), and DoD Information Network
(DODIN) operations; it also defines related cyberspace
actions that may be employed to accomplish the CO
missions.42 To help clarify these missions and actions,
JP 3-14 (R) discusses in considerable detail how the six
joint functions apply to CO.43
With regard to authorities, roles, and responsibilities, JP 3-12 (R) includes not only the U.S. Code Title
10 duties for joint cyberspace forces, but also potential support to other U.S. Government departments
for national responses to cyberspace incidents as well
as the protection of critical infrastructure and key
resources (CIKR).44 The publication identifies cyberspace support elements (CSEs) as the deployed units
that integrate USCYBERCOM capabilities to CCMDs.
CSEs help to achieve situational awareness in cyberspace as well as to develop target lists and synchronize
joint fires in part through their coordination with the
CCMD JCC (see Appendix II of this monograph for
depiction of cyberspace C2 structure).45
Finally, JP 3-12 (R) considers how joint operations
in cyberspace should mesh with joint, interorganizational, and international planning and coordination.
It makes a crucial caveat regarding the complexity of
cyberspace, noting, “second and higher order effects
in and through cyberspace can be more difficult to
predict, necessitating more branches and sequels in
plans.”46 For the integration and synchronization of
joint fires, use of cyberspace capabilities will follow
an existing coordination apparatus, such as working
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groups and prioritized target lists. Importantly, the JP
clarifies that cyberspace capabilities may be not only a
viable option for engaging joint targets, but also may
be the best choice.47
Compared to joint space doctrine, the publication
of the first joint cyberspace doctrine came soon after its
designation as a warfighting domain. As with space,
there is no widely accepted theory for military CO
yet, and there remain significant uncertainties regarding how CO relates (or should relate) to IO and EMS
constructs.48
Table 1 summarizes the major missions areas identified in joint publications for land, space, and CO. It
also indicates whether a joint publication addressed
the joint functions and principle of joint operations.
Given this basic understanding of the key elements of
the joint doctrine for these domains, let us now examine how U.S. Army doctrine treats them.

12

Principles of War/
Joint Operations
Addressed?

Joint Functions
Addressed?

Joint Doctrine and
Operational
Missions Specified
Therein

Domain
Land

JP 3-31 (February 2014)
• Offensive operations
• Defensive operations
• Stability operations
• Homeland defense
• Defense support of civil authorities

Yes

No

Space

JP 3-14 (May 2013)
• Space situational awareness
• Space force enhancement
• Space support
• Space control
• Space force application

No

Yes

Cyberspace

JP 3-12 (February 2013)
• OCO
• DCO
• DODIN operations

Yes

No

Table 1. Comparison of Land, Space, and
Cyberspace Joint Operations Doctrine.49
Army Land Operations Doctrine
Following the establishment of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), doctrine
for Landpower has evolved from the venerable Field
Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (1976, 1982, 1986, 1993
versions), to the new designation of FM 3-0, Operations (2001, 2008 versions), and finally to the current
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) No. 3-0, Unified
Land Operations.50 Published in October 2011 as part
of the Doctrine 2015 initiative, ADP 3-0 is the latest
evolution of the capstone document that provides a
13

common operational concept for U.S. Army forces that
must “operate across the range of military operations,
integrating their actions with joint, interagency, and
multinational partners as part of a larger effort.”51 The
main focus of U.S. Army units in this team effort is
to “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and
maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained
land operations to create conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”52
ADP 3-0 recognizes that the dynamic operational
environment includes interactions with other domains.
It identifies the foundations of unified land operations
as initiative, decisive action, U.S. Army core competencies (combined arms maneuver and wide area security), and mission command. It also presents the tenets
of unified land operations as flexibility, integration,
lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization.
ADP 3-0 discusses six warfighting functions consistent
with those of joint doctrine, except that the U.S. Army
replaces C2 with mission command. A concise document by design, ADP 3-0 refers to space and cyberspace as domains in the operational environment, but
does not include any other specific details with regard
to how the domains affect land operations.53
Army Space Operations Doctrine
In 2006, TRADOC published Pamphlet 525-74, Space Operations Concept Capability Plan (CCP), in
part to “Systematically and deliberately evolve Army
space support operations over time to provide dedicated, responsive theater focused support to operational and tactical commanders.”54 The CCP stresses
the joint interdependency of military operations, and
asserts that “space operations are inherently joint, and
joint interdependence is essential for the conduct of
14

all space operations.”55 Pamphlet 525-7-4 identifies the
Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army
Forces Strategic Command as the Army Service component to joint space operations that provides support for SATCOM, theater missile warning, blue force
tracking, and situational awareness.56 The CCP uses
a detailed operational vignette to demonstrate how
space capabilities would support the Army Modular
Force construct and concludes, “space power must
be viewed in the larger construct of joint operations.
Army space operations depend on the successful Army
and joint transformation and exploitation of the space
domain.”57
The U.S. Army published the first FM 3-14, Space
Support to Army Operations in 2005, which superseded
FM 100-18 (1995) under the older doctrine system.
FM 3-14 was updated in 2010 and again updated in
August 2014 to its current version, Army Space Operations.58 This latest version added a distribution restriction, therefore its content cannot be discussed in detail
herein.59 In general terms, FM 3-14 remains very consistent with the content of JP 3-14, echoing the five joint
mission areas for space. FM 3-14 also discusses how the
foundations and tenets of unified land operations from
ADP 3-0 apply to space operations. It then provides
details regarding how the U.S. Army organizes space
units as well as how SSEs support different U.S. Army
echelons. For practical application, FM 3-14 includes an
appendix that provides a detailed template for Annex
N to joint plans and orders.
U.S. Army Cyberspace Operations (CO) Doctrine
In February 2010, TRADOC released the Cyberspace
Operations Concept Capabilities Plan (Pamphlet 525-7-8),
with its central idea of:
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prevailing in the cyber-electromagnetic contest means
making progress at the same time along three lines of
effort: gaining advantage, protecting that advantage, and
placing adversaries at a disadvantage.60

Pamphlet 525-7-8 emphasizes the interrelated nature
of cyberspace operations (CyberOps or CO), electronic
warfare (EW), and IO, and proposes that the U.S.
Army address these complex notions at three levels: a
psychological contest of wills, a strategic engagement,
and a cyber-electromagnetic contest.61 The Cyberspace Operations CCP offers a CyberOps framework
comprised of four components: cyber situational
awareness (CyberSA), cyber network operations
(CyNetOps), cyber warfare (CyWar), and cyber support (CySpt).62 The pamphlet appendices use three
operational vignettes to help identify and propose
many required capabilities for CyberOps. As
intended, the CCP provides the conceptual foundation upon which subsequent U.S. Army
cyberspace doctrine—FM 3-38 and FM 3-12—is built.
Published in February 2014, FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, is the first attempt by the U.S.
Army to produce an FM focused on integration and
synchronizing of the new concept of cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA).63 FM 3-38 provides an overview of the CEMA concept and the commander’s role
in CEMA operations (see Appendix III of this monograph for a graphic depiction of the CEMA concept). It
then dedicates a chapter to the tactics and procedures
for three areas: CO, EW, and spectrum management
operations. The FM closes with discussion on how
CEMA is planned, integrated, and executed in unified
land operations.
FM 3-38 was released a year after the release of the
classified JP 3-12, and its description of CO are consistent with details of the releasable version of JP 3-12
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(R) that followed 8 months later. The FM echoes the
three-layer depiction of cyberspace (physical, logical,
cyber-persona) as well as the three missions of cyberspace forces (OCO, DCO, and DODIN) and Cyberspace Operational Preparation of the Environment
(C-OPE). It also provides details on the interfaces
between CEMA and LandWarNet (the U.S. Army’s
portion of the DODIN) in CO and DODIN planning
and operations.
There are many favorable aspects of the content
in FM 3-38. First, the FM embraces the cross-domain
nature of cyberspace. Next, it explicitly spells out the
soldier’s role in CEMA to help them better “understand
the relationship between cyberspace and the EMS and
maintain the necessary protection measures when
using devices that leverage this relationship between
capabilities.”64 The FM presents the CEMA element as
the part of a commander’s staff that “integrates CEMA
into the operations process from theater Army through
brigade”65 as well as a CEMA working group to coordinate with internal and external units and centers.66
Finally, FM 3-38 provides a practical and detailed template for documenting CEMA as appendix 12 to annex
C (Operations) in a standard joint operations plan or
order.
Attempts to develop U.S. Army cyberspace doctrine
have been in work for years, but the proposed FM 3-12,
Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations had not yet
been published at the conclusion of the research for
this monograph.67 Despite the delay in the completion
of this FM, the U.S. Army is doing well with incorporating space and cyberspace into traditional land operations. To apply this information to the education of
its senior leaders, the U.S. Army War College’s Center
for Strategic Leadership released a Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide in June 2016.68 However, there
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remains much to do as land-based operations adapt to
space and cyberspace domains that continue to evolve
and grow in their significance to operations across
multiple domains.
OPERATIONS IN MULTIPLE DOMAINS
Having reviewed the basic joint and U.S. Army
doctrine for land, space, and cyberspace, let us now
explore how operations in the domains interact. This
section explores the concept of cross-domain synergy
and its ability to enhance globally integrated operations. It also examines the existing processes and entities defined in doctrine that provide expertise and
support to JFCs. Do joint forces in these three domains
have existing means available to facilitate cross-domain synergy?
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)
To support the President’s and Secretary of
Defense’s 21st-century defense priorities, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff published the new Capstone Concept
for Joint Operations for Joint Force 2020 (CCJO) in September 2014. Its central concept is globally integrated
operations that embody eight key elements.69 The
CCJO predicts that space and cyberspace will become
increasingly important to joint operations and “will
become both а precursor to and integral part of armed
combat in the land, maritime and air domains.”70 Space
and cyberspace forces also present “flexible, low-signature or small-footprint capabilities” that are:
rapidly deployable, largely able to operate independently
from logistically intensive forces, have operational reach,
and can be persistent. Perhaps most significantly, their
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use does not always constitute an irreversible policy
commitment.71

The CCJO also asserts that cyberspace capabilities
enable global agility necessary to support “swift and
adaptable military responses.”72 Further, it considers that adversaries may also find such operational
advantages attractive and opt to attack exclusively in
cyberspace.73
In its prognosis of future threat environments, the
CCJO expects adversaries to obtain advanced capabilities that can be applied across multiple domains.
To help posture joint forces for success, the globally
integrated operations concept includes the key element of cross-domain synergy that will allow an integrated joint force “to exploit even small advantages in
one domain to create or increase advantages in others,
compounding those mutually reinforcing advantages
until they overwhelm an enemy.”74
Cross-Domain Operations
In January 2016, the Joint Staff J-7 published the
Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations Planner’s
Guide in part to address this element of the CCJO’s goal
of globally integrated operations. The guide defines
cross-domain synergy as “the complementary vice
merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness
and compensates for the vulnerabilities of others.”75
The Planner’s Guide stresses that cross-domain synergy
“is not an end in itself, but a by-product of effective
joint planning.”76 It avers that the major challenge of
achieving such synergy is for the JFC to access and
utilize diverse domain expertise; hence, the guide
provides a brief primer of how existing support and
liaison elements can provide support within the joint
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operation planning process (JOPP).77 In turn, effective
joint planning is dependent in part upon the planners’
knowledge of each domain’s strengths and vulnerabilities. While cross-domain operations have been an
integral part of U.S. military operations for decades,
the incorporation by planners of capabilities from the
new domains of space and cyberspace is in its infancy.
Unique Domain Characteristics and Capabilities
The Planner’s Guide provides an overview of capabilities, characteristics, and operations for each of the
traditional domains, plus space and cyberspace. It is
useful to explore how the guide views the individual
domains before looking at how it discusses cross-domain operations. Much of the guide’s material appears
in joint doctrine, but it includes some new commentary as well. Let us examine how the guide portrays
the domains for land, space, and cyberspace.
Land Domain. Table 2 presents an analysis of
aspects of the land domain presented as unique by the
Planner’s Guide. Although the proposed traits may be
consistent with joint doctrine, collectively they are misleading. Certainly, land is not the only domain to have
significant operational environment variations—all
domains have such factors that help define the domain
itself. Also, noncombatants are present in all physical
domains, and their safety must be a consideration in
joint operations. The two most distinctive characteristics of the land domain are: the ability to assemble
large supply stores for sustained operations, and the
slower movement of forces across land when compared to movement in other domains.
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Land Domain
Proposed Unique Characteristic
or Capability*

Critical Assessment

(a) Extreme variations in climate and
terrain—urban, forest, desert, jungle,
mountain, and arctic—present dramatically different operational environments.

(a) Not unique. Climate and topography also have significant
implications for the design and operation of maritime, air, and space
forces.

(b) Presence of people, especially (b) Not unique. Although the vast
non-combatants, effects options for use majority of Earth’s population lives
on land, people are present in the
of military force.
sea domain for extended periods
of time as well. Also, the presence
of non-combatants must be considered in all domains.
(c) The ability to sustain operations over (c) Unique. One can argue that
long periods of time.
extended sea and air operations
ultimately depend upon landbased assets through ports and
airfields for long-duration sustainment.
(d) The speed and duration of move- (d) Unique (on average). Movement on land is slower and more ardu- ment of large land forces over unous than movement by air and sea.
familiar terrain may be a limiting
factor of a given operation.
(e) With respect to non-lethal effects,
only land forces have directly useful
capability that can be precisely applied
in complex, human terrain. Non-lethal
effects work through example and the
potential threat of violence rather than
the execution of that threat. Although
all services have the ability to affect
their counterparts through security assistance activities, only land forces can
achieve the position (close to the population dispersed in complex land clutter) and duration (persistence) that permits sustained non-lethal effect.

(e) Inaccurate. The topic of this
paragraph is unclear, but it contains several elements that are not
necessarily tied to land. One can
argue that cyberspace can also have
long-term and persistent contact with
dispersed populations to achieve
non-lethal effects using means such
as social media.

Note: 
*The text from this column is from the Cross-Domain
Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide.78

Table 2. Assessment of Land Characteristics and
Capabilities.
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Space Domain. Table 3 shows the assessment of
how the space domain is depicted in the Planner’s
Guide. Upon examination, none of the characteristics
or capabilities listed is truly unique. Indeed, operations
in all domains must consider the environment, utilize
EMS, and obey the laws of physics. The Planner’s Guide
defines space as “a medium like the land, sea, and air
within which military activities shall be conducted to
achieve US national security objectives,”79 however,
this definition in not included in official joint doctrine.
Despite the lack of a clear demarcation for space by
the United States and many other countries, there are
still many international treaties and conventions that
attempt to govern its use.80
Space Domain
Proposed Unique Characteristic or
Capability*

Critical Assessment

(a) There are no geographical
boundaries in space. As a Global
Commons, space overcomes the international law aspect of a nation’s
territorial sovereignty [emphasis in
original].

(a) Not unique. One can argue that
geosynchronous orbit spots have
some equivalence to sovereignty
based on the location and frequency use of the satellite.**

(b) Satellites are subject to the laws (b) Not unique. All physical doof orbital mechanics. Adjustments to mains are subject to the laws of
orbits expend fuel and reduce asset physics.
life span.
(c) Environmental considerations
place demands on satellites’ characteristics to include size, weight, and
power, further hindering the spacecraft’s performance and life span.

(c) Not unique. Recall that the land
domain section also tried to claim
the environment as its unique trait
(see Table 2). Again, each domain
must consider environmental factors in operational planning.

(d) Though space is infinite in expanse, certain altitudes and orbital
patterns are advantageous. These
portions of space are becoming
crowded.

(d) Not a characteristic or capability. The statement is an observation
about the current construct and
population of space objects.

Table 3. Assessment of Space Characteristics and
Capabilities.
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(e) Electromagnetic spectrum access
is vital to space operations because it
is the sole medium for space-based
assets to transmit and receive information and/or signals [emphasis in
original]. Therefore, JFCs must sufficiently control the EMS to interact
with space systems.

(e) Not unique. Certainly use of the
EMS enables space operations, but
the EMS supports operations in all
domains (this will be discussed in
more detail in the implications section of this monograph).

(f) Space is no longer a domain exclusively transited by state actors. Many
non-state actors maintain assets in
orbit and often military capabilities
(Iridium satellite phones, Virgin
space tourism, etc.) employ these
non-state assets.

(f) Not unique. Space has been
used by nonstate actors since 1961,
4 years after Sputnik 1. The evolution and proliferation of commercial and other nonstate space assets
has evolved with military use.

Notes: 
*
The text from this column is from the Cross-Domain
Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide.81
**For more on this topic, see Iulia-Diana Galeriu’s “‘Paper
satellites’ and the free use of outer space.”82

Table 3. Assessment of Space Characteristics and
Capabilities. (cont.)
Cyberspace Domain. Table 4 summarizes the analysis of how the cyberspace domain is described in
the Planner’s Guide. Like the descriptions of land and
space, the portrayal of cyberspace is fraught with inaccuracies, the most egregious of which are those that
infer that activities in cyberspace are almost magic in
that they are not subject to the limitations of time and
space. In fact, the transmission of information must
comply with the laws of physics, albeit on a much
smaller scale than those of the traditional domains.
The Planner’s Guide includes a table taken from a scholarly work that compares “Cyberspace vs. Traditional
Warfare Domain Characteristic,” but the table contents
do not match those in the guide’s text.83 Curiously,
the guide omits the one unique aspect of cyberspace
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explicitly noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report:
The man-made nature of cyberspace distinguishes it from
other domains in which the U.S. armed forces operate. The
Administration will continue to explore the implications
of cyberspace’s unique attributes for policies regarding
operations within it.84

FM 3-38 provides a much better rendering of
cyberspace for those unfamiliar with the domain.
The manual’s discussion on the characteristics of the
cyberspace domain includes many concepts that merit
attention, such as cyberspace as a system of systems;
its dynamic and evolving nature; its lack of confinement to a physical site; and the continued maintenance
required for its existence.85 FM 3-38 also includes an
alternative definition that may provide better insight
to planners: “Cyberspace is an environment created
and maintained for the purpose of facilitating the use
and exploitation of information, human interaction,
and intercommunication.”86
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Cyberspace Domain
Proposed Unique Characteristic or

Critical Assessment

(a) Cyberspace is a global enabler for
expedient, dynamic information exchange impacting all aspects of life
[emphasis in original]. It allows instantaneous information flow across
the globe for financial transactions as
well as the movement and tracking of
products and goods. However, it also
allows adversaries to access this information and disrupt vital operations
from any location. Cyberspace is difficult to regulate due to ease of accessibility. From a military perspective,
cyberspace activities rarely require
movement of forces, allowing engagement from extended stand-off ranges.
It also enables the influence of populations that are inaccessible through the
other domains.

(a) Inaccurate. These characteristics
appear to be more appropriate for
describing a commons rather than
a domain. Also, the use of “instantaneous information flow” is misleading since transmission of data
through cyberspace takes a finite
amount of time that has great relevance on the scale of timing for CO.**

(b) Can be reverse engineered: Unlike
munitions, which are normally destroyed upon use, cyberspace activities include code that can be saved,
analyzed, and recoded for use against
allies or friendly nations [emphasis in
original]. Planners must account for
the possibility of a “boomerang effect”
in which cyber activities are turned
against the originator through reverse
engineering.

(b) Inaccurate. This proposed trait
confuses the domain of cyberspace
with the potential weapons used
therein. It may not be possible to recreate all aspects of cyberspace for forensics or reserve engineering due to
the nature of complex adaptive systems. Also, physical weapons may
not detonate as intended and may be
used in an improvised manner by an
adversary or may leave behind remnants that are subject to forensics.

Capability*

(c) No Single National/International (c) Not unique. No single nation or
Ownership: While someone owns each entity owns all of the land, maritime,
physical component of cyberspace, the air, or space domains either.
whole of cyberspace is not under any
single nations’ or entities’ complete
control [emphasis in original]. The infrastructure is a disparate combination
of public and private networks without standardized security or access
controls. This arrangement enables
free information flow, but the lack of
controls hinders global accountability,
standardization, and security.

Table 4. Assessment of Cyberspace Characteristics
and Capabilities.
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Cyberspace Domain
(d) Lack of Cooperation/Collaboration: The lack of international laws and
regulations governing the environment complicates responses to actions
in this domain [emphasis in original].
The difficulty in tracing the source of
a cyberattack makes them easily deniable, especially if conducted by individual “hackers.” Further hindering
collaboration is the tendency to deny
that a cyberspace attack has occurred
to prevent loss of trust in an organization’s cyber security measures.

(d) Inaccurate. While the processes
are far from perfect, there is significant cooperation and collaboration
in cyberspace through such organizations as the UN, European Union,
International Criminal Police Organization, and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO).***
In fact, one could argue that the Internet would not exist and function
without ongoing cooperation and
collaboration in cyberspace.

(e) Low Cost: Cyberspace is the most
affordable domain through which to
attack the United States [emphasis in
original]. Viruses, malicious code, and
training are readily available over the
Internet at no cost. Adversaries can
develop, edit, and reuse current tools
for network attacks. Inexpensive tools
and training allow an adversary to
compete without costly ships, aircraft,
or missiles. Furthermore, an adversary can impose significant financial
burdens on nations that rely heavily
on cyberspace by forcing them to invest in cyberspace defense. Currently,
“military-grade” cyberspace capabilities remain too expensive for most malign actors, but they can buy relatively
inexpensive services of professional
hackers.

(e) Inaccurate. This characteristic
would benefit from a more complete context. As stated, it reflects
popular beliefs that readily available
computer code can rival the power
of sophisticated weapons systems.
The concept of affordability here is
misleading in that low-cost access
to cyberspace does not equal capabilities of a nation state. One could
argue that, given the same analogy,
perhaps an assassin’s rifle is equal to
the power of an army.

(f) Volatile: Successful cyberspace attacks depend on vulnerabilities within
the adversary’s network [emphasis in
original]. Identifying these vulnerabilities and creating cyberspace capabilities sometimes require great expense.
If an adversary discovers the targeted
network’s vulnerability and closes it,
the cyberspace attack technique is rendered immediately and unexpectedly
useless despite the development expense. For this reason, great care must
be taken to prevent alerting adversaries to vulnerabilities in their networks.

(f) Inaccurate. The term “volatile”
may apply to activities in cyberspace,
but one can argue that such volatility
also exists in land operations (e.g.,
the fog and friction of war). Perhaps a more useful characterization
would be to model cyberspace as a
complex adaptive system. It is interesting to note that there seems to be
conflicting perspectives promulgated within this entry “(f)”and previous entry “(e)” regarding the cost of
cyberspace attacks.

Table 4. Assessment of Cyberspace Characteristics
and Capabilities. (cont.)
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Cyberspace Domain
(g) Speed: Cyberspace operations [CO]
occur quickly [emphasis in original].
However, preparation for those operations is often extensive. An intense
study of the adversary’s network may
be required to learn system specifications and understand patterns of life.
Therefore, a cyberspace unit operating
on one adversary’s networks may not
be able to shift focus to another target
without substantial preparation.

(g) Inaccurate and not unique. This
entry mingles speed of operations,
operations tempo, and C-OPE. Operations in other domains may also
occur quickly after extended ISR and
planning. As with characteristic entry “(a),” use of the word “quickly”
is vague and of little use without a
time scale for CO.

(h) Unintentional cascading effects:
Another unique characteristic of cyberspace is the potential for unintended cascading effects [emphasis in original]. Capabilities and munitions in the
natural domains lose momentum the
greater distance from impact. However, physical distance means very
little in cyberspace. While cyberspace
capabilities are developed and evaluated in computer labs and cyberspace
ranges, there can never be complete
assurances as to how a capability will
behave or where it might spread when
introduced to the great expanse of cyberspace.

(h) Not unique and inaccurate.
Physical weapons may also experience “unintended cascading effects.”
Also, the assertion that “physical
distance in cyberspace means very
little” propagates an ignorance of the
timescales of cyberspace activity. Information traveling through cyberspace is still subject to finite speeds
that may affect their integration and
synchronization with other operations.

(i) Layers: Cyberspace consists of three
layers: Physical Network, Logical Network, and Cyber-Persona [emphasis
in original].****
Adversaries might attack any of these
layers to disrupt, degrade, or destroy
cyberspace capability. Conversely,
each of these layers presents a means
to attack adversaries’ use of cyberspace [emphasis in original].

(i) Inaccurate. While this is useful
information, it is one of many artificial constructs used to analyze
cyberspace rather than an intrinsic
characteristic.

Notes: *The text from this column is from the Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide.87
**For more on this topic, see the Internet Traffic Report.88
***For more on this topic, see the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report 10-606.89
****For more on this topic, see the Planner’s Guide.90

Table 4. Assessment of Cyberspace Characteristics
and Capabilities. (cont.)
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Some readers may find the assessments in Tables
2 to 4 to be a bit pedantic; however, accuracy matters
in the quest to equip joint planners with a full and
common understanding of what a domain of military
operations comprises. As an inaugural document to
encourage cross-domain synergy, the Planner’s Guide
has considerable merit. It is reasonable to assume that
the sections for specific domains were written or influenced by practitioners who may unwittingly advocate
their domain vice merely describe it. Perhaps such bias
may be addressed in future versions by comparing an
impartial set of characteristics amongst the domains
vice trying to argue for “unique” attributes. Surely,
the development and acknowledgment of basic theory
for military operations in space and cyberspace could
provide the necessary foundation upon which to build
better doctrine.
Support Relationships Among Domains
Having assessed the individual domain interpretations for land, space, and cyberspace, let us now
consider how doctrine incorporates the means advocated in the Planner’s Guide to achieve cross-domain
synergy. Table 5 is a composite of excerpts from doctrine covered in the first section of this monograph that
are organized to illustrate how these three domains
support each other’s missions. Note that this is not to
be confused with a discussion of roles for supported
versus supporting commanders. Clearly, there are
ample examples in existing doctrine to demonstrate
how the domains enable or enhance joint operations.
Most of these examples would remain the same if sea
or air substituted for land.
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Domain
with
Supporting
Capabilities

Domain with Supported Capabilities

Land

Land

Space

Cyberspace

Plan for and provide force protection for space infrastructure
and forces assigned, deployed,
and operating in their [CCMD]
AOR.91

Operations in cyberspace rely
on the links and nodes that exist in the natural domains. . . .
Operations in the other domains create effects in and
through cyberspace by affecting the EMS, the data, or the
physical infrastructure.92

GPS plays a key role in military
operations by enabling precise
location and navigation in all four
physical domains (land, maritime,
air, and space).94

Space provides a key global
connectivity option for CO.93

The inherent precision of GPS
allows precise site surveys,
emplacement of artillery, target
acquisition, and navigation. GPS
establishes a “common reference
grid” within the operational area,
enables a “common time,” helps
establish “common direction,”
and facilitates synchronized operations.96

[T]he linkages between space
and cyberspace are of particular importance as space
provides a global connectivity
option for CO.95

Space

The space support element [SSE]
. . . Supports the G-2 (S-2) during
intelligence preparation of the
battlefield.98

Space capabilities provide cyberspace with a global reach.97
GPS plays a key role in military
operations . . . by providing
precise timing
in cyberspace.99

The space support element
[SSE] . . . Provides space-based
expertise and services that
enhance CEMA. . . . Integrates
space-related capabilities into
CEMA planning. . . . Analyzes
and recommends the potential
employment of additional
space-related capabilities to
support CEMA.100

Table 5. Mutual Support Relationships Among Land,
Space, and Cyberspace.
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Cyberspace

The physical domains (air, land,
maritime, and space) and information environment rely on
cyberspace for instant communications.102

CO provide a means by which
space support is executed.101

[O]perations in cyberspace enable
freedom of action for operations
in the four natural domains and
the EMS.103

[C]yberspace provides the
means by which space control
and transmission of space sensor data are conducted.104

Using OCO, commanders can
mass effects through the employment of lethal and nonlethal
actions leveraging all capabilities
available to gain advantages in
cyberspace that support objectives on land.106

Operations in the space domain depend on cyberspace
and the EMS to execute space
support.105

Mutual Space and Cyberspace

The relationship between space and cyberspace is unique in that
virtually all space operations depend on cyberspace, and a critical portion of cyberspace can only be provided via space operations. . . . These interrelationships are important considerations
across the spectrum of CO, and particularly when conducting
targeting in cyberspace.107
These interrelationships are critical, and the linkages must be
addressed during all phases of joint operation planning.108
The cyberspace and space domains are uniquely interrelated
primarily because of their current role in telecommunications
and networks. . . .These interrelationships are important considerations when planning for CEMA.109
CO produces NAVWAR [navigation warfare] effects by assuring friendly access and/or denying enemy access to positioning, navigation, and timing information transmitted by global
navigation satellite system (GNSS) or other radio navigation
aid signals. Creation of global and theater NAVWAR effects is
attained through the coordinated employment of CO, EW, and
space operations.110

Table 5. Mutual Support Relationships Among
Land, Space, and Cyberspace. (cont.)
The bottom portion of Table 5 focuses on areas
of operational interdependence between space and
cyberspace, most of which deal with signal transmission. Further, JP 3-12 (R) provides insight into the complex interactions between space, cyberspace, and the
EMS, as well as the effects they can collectively realize:
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Domain Overlap. CO enhance operational effectiveness
and leverage various capabilities from physical domains
to create effects, which may span multiple GCCs
AOR. Some of the capabilities the JFC may employ in
conjunction with, or to enable CO, include significant
portions of electronic warfare (EW), EMS management,
C2, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
navigation warfare (NAVWAR), and some space mission
areas. Advancements in technology have created an
increasingly complex OE [operational environment]. CO,
space operations, and EW operations can be conducted
against targets using portions of the EMS. They can be
integrated with other information related capabilities
as part of IO. CO, space operations, and EW operations
are often conducted under specific authorities. Likewise,
some information-related capabilities supported by CO,
such as MISO [military information support operations],
MILDEC [military deception], and special technical
operations (STO), have their own execution approval
process [emphasis in original].111

The evolving interplay of space, cyberspace, information, and EMS operations at times resembles a doctrinal
Gordian Knot that can frustrate planners and warfighters pursuing mission command necessary to conduct
unified land operations.112 What support elements are
available to help the JFLCC cope with this situation?
Domain Support to JFLCC
Table 6 recaps the key elements of space and cyberspace forces from joint doctrine and organizes them by
the type of integration they may provide for the JFLCC
to achieve cross-domain synergy. If properly implemented, the existing arrangements appear to provide
an acceptable framework for integrating and synchronizing space and CO into the JFLCC. As per the routine development of doctrine, the tactical details from
actual experience should be captured and documented
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in media such as joint and service lessons learned and
tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Integration Means

Space

Depiction of notional
organizational
structure?

No

Link to JOPP plans
and orders?

Annex N

Annex C (Appendix
16) and Annex K

Enduring support
element?

SSE

CSE

Operational support
elements?

Cyberspace
Yes
(JP 3-12 (R) Figure
IV-1)

• Space Operations Section
in J-33 Current
Operations

• Cyberspace Operations Section
in J-33 Current
Operations

• Space Tasking
Order

• Cyberspace Cell
in J-5

• Missile Warning
Support Request*

• Joint Cyberspace
Center (JCC)
• Cyberspace
Effects Request
Form**

Notes: *The Missile Warning Support Request.113
**Cyberspace Effects Request Form.114

Table 6. Space and Cyberspace Cross-Domain
Elements in JFLCC Doctrine.
Joint force development and the refinement of doctrine also require the consideration of new concepts
driven by strategic insights from DoD and the joint
staff.115 Having now explored the cross-domain tenets
and nominal applications of land, space, and cyberspace means to achieve synergy in JFLCC operations,
let us now investigate two derivative documents of
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the CCJO that further address the future challenges of
operational access to domains.
Operational Access
In January 2012, the DoD released the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) to describe “how joint
forces will operate in response to emerging antiaccess
and area-denial security challenges.”116 It focuses on a
central theme of cross-domain synergy and it “envisions a greater degree and more flexible integration of
space and cyberspace operations [CO] into traditional
air-sea-land battlespace than ever before.”117 The concept argues that one of the three key trends affecting
future joint force projection is “the emergence of space
and cyberspace as increasingly important and contested domains.”118 The JOAC supposes that operations
in these new domains will precede those in the traditional domains, perhaps even to the degree that “even
in the absence of open conflict, operations to gain and
maintain cyberspace superiority and space control will
be continuous requirements.”119
To guide the planning of joint access operations,
the JOAC proposes 11 Operational Access Precepts,
the last of which is to “protect friendly space and cyber
assets while attacking the enemy’s space and cyber
capabilities” since these domains “are now essential to
all joint force projection.”120 Further, the JOAC infers
that the success of space and CO may leverage the
combat power from the traditional domains.121 In general, this shift to focus on space and cyberspace is a
theme throughout the JOAC. Several of the precepts
favor reduced use of land forces that is offset in many
cases by increased space and CO. One precept specifically cautions against over-committing forces into
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hostile territory, especially major land forces.122 The
precept to “seize the initiative by deploying and operating on multiple, independent lines of operations,”
predicts a reduced presence in the land domain, as it
“suggests smaller units and platforms that are rapidly
deployable yet lethal.”123 Also, the precept aimed at disrupting enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities notes that “large land forces generally will be
the last to penetrate within range of an enemy’s antiaccess and area-denial weapons because of the potential
for catastrophic loss.”124 Finally, with regard to basing
options, the JOAC suggests a minimized dependence
on forward bases with more dependence on capabilities such as long-range strike, cyberspace, space, and
EW.125 The JOAC avers that space and cyberspace
capabilities may be used in advance of other forces to
facilitate operational access.126 In addition, the JOAC
alleges that cyberspace capabilities may help to maximize operational surprise and complicate enemy targeting processes.127
Entry Operations
In April 2014, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Martin Dempsey released the Joint Concept for
Entry Operations (JCEO) as his “vision for how joint
forces will enter onto foreign territory and immediately employ capabilities to accomplish assigned missions.”128 The JCEO was written to support the JOAC
with a central idea of “full integration of force capabilities across domains.”129 The concept calls for the use
of “mission-tailored joint forces that are organized,
trained, and equipped with unique capabilities.”130
The JCEO lists seven operational characteristics that
are mostly enduring considerations with the exception
of the relatively new characteristic of “social media,
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cultural factors, and commercial capabilities” which
has ties to CO and IO.131
Consistent with JOAC, the JCEO calls for earlier
use of cyberspace capabilities, and explicitly calls for
pre-crisis activities to include C-OPE that is “clearly
integrated and synchronized with operations in other
domains.”132 Cyberspace may also be used to enable
operational deception efforts to gain surprise, complicate the enemy’s targeting process, and reduce collateral damage.133 Also, space and cyberspace can enable
joint fires as well as enhance joint and allied C2 interoperability for cyberspace.134 Finally, the JCEO contends
that properly integrated cyberspace and space capabilities may enhance land maneuver.135
It appears that the inculcation of cross-domain synergy into the joint force remains a work in progress.
Fortunately, existing concepts and doctrine provide
the necessary foundation upon which to build and
hone joint capabilities that span domains as required
by circumstance. Joint concepts such as the CCJO,
JOAC, and JCEO anticipate increased contributions
from capabilities in the space and cyberspace domain
to enable the success of future military operations,
especially those faced with A2/AD challenges. How
will this future unfold for the joint force?
FUTURE OPERATIONS
Armed with knowledge of how activities in the
individual domains of land, space, and cyberspace
may intersect and integrate to enhance joint force operations, let us now explore how such operations may
change in the future. This section explores probable
future operating environments as well as the resulting implications for the U.S. Army and joint force
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development. It also identifies operational challenges
that cut across all domains and makes recommendations to help prepare for the envisioned future.
Future Environment
Joint Operating Environment (JOE)
In July 2016, the joint staff released Joint Operating Environment, JOE 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World, to convey future security
contexts and implications to aid the joint force development. In its view of the evolving world order,
JOE 2035 contends that regional powers will pursue
competitive space and cyberspace capabilities that
enable their global reach.136 These capabilities may be
enhanced by the proliferation of technologies, such as
high-powered radio frequency (HPRF) weapons and
non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons
that may counter U.S. strengths in space and cyberspace.137 JOE 2035 weaves this trend into two of its six
Contexts of Future Conflict. The context of “Disrupted
Global Commons” centers on the “denial or compulsion in spaces and places available to all but owned by
none.”138 The context assumes an enduring land-centric nature of conflict, noting that much of the conflict
in commons is intended to influence events on land.139
Also, this context predicts very intense rivalry for EMS
usage as well as increasingly fierce military activities
in the space domain that may include intentional interference from other satellites or ground-based systems
as well as anti-satellite weapons (ASAT).140
The JOE 2035 purposefully excludes cyberspace
from the global commons context, instead giving it
an exclusive context on “A Conflict for Cyberspace,”
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where it suggests, “conflict and war are likely to occur
as states struggle to define and credibly protect sovereignty in cyberspace.”141 In addition to direct military conflict at the tactical and operational levels as
well as attacks on homeland critical infrastructure, JOE
2035 foresees the conflict expanding to all elements
of national power, noting that “the competition may
involve disrupting data, networks, and the physical
systems of competitors to gain economic, military,
and political advantages.”142 Finally, this context infers
that cyberspace capabilities are paradoxical in that the
strengths provided by the vast and complex connectivity of the domain may also introduce substantial
weaknesses:
Where land and naval power intersect in two dimensions,
air and space in three, cyberspace intersects with other
domains in thousands, or even millions of ways. This
presents many new vulnerable points through which
weapons systems, and the circuitry and software upon
which they rely, will be directly engaged.143

To address such threats and challenges, JOE 2035
proposes a series of 24 evolving joint missions organized by 4 groups of enduring military tasks. While all
of these missions may utilize support from space and
cyberspace capabilities, the missions connected with
the two contexts described above have explicit and significant expectations for space and cyberspace forces.
Table 7 provides some excerpts from JOE 2035 in each
of these mission areas to provide the reader with an
appreciation for the depth and diversity of capabilities
required for the joint force should these projections
come to fruition.
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Enduring Military Tasks
Shape or contain to assist the
United States with coping and
adapting to changed international security conditions [emphasis in original].

Deter or deny to manage the antagonistic behavior of competitors or to impose costs on competitors or adversaries taking
aggressive action [emphasis in
original].

Space and Cyberspace-Related Missions
Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. . . . Specifically, the Joint Force may conduct ambiguous actions and deception operations with
low-signature assets to avoid direct confrontation with a competitor, while still demonstrating U.S. resolve to use and keep open the
commons for military and civilian purposes
[emphasis in original].
Military Support to Cyber Resiliency. This mission will require cyber support to U.S. Government and civilian organizations, allied
nations, and other international partners that
credibly reinforces the resilience of cyber-dependent systems and infrastructure. This
includes a capacity to reliably communicate,
compute, store, and retrieve critical data that
outpaces adversary efforts to deny these capabilities [emphasis in original].
Global Commons Stabilization. . . . Joint Force
must be capable of protecting national objectives in the global commons despite the use of
asymmetric, unconventional, and hybrid approaches by competitors to assert new claims
and exercise more control in the commons.
This will require operations that impose costs
on adversaries who impede free use of the
commons, such as targeted electromagnetic
and space denial measures, the enforcement
of sanctions, or the establishment of electromagnetic exclusion zones [emphasis in original].
Network Defense. These missions will require
steady-state information operations [IO] in
support of national cyber deterrence strategies that communicate the resiliency of critical
U.S. systems and infrastructure, while protecting their vulnerabilities. Key actions may
include the development of a Department of
Defense [DoD] cyber umbrella; the creation
of a national ‘cyber border patrol;’ more comprehensive intelligence sharing efforts; contributions to national level cyber exercises;
the development of hardened networks; and
reinforced coordination with domestic law
enforcement [emphasis in original].

Table 7. Evolving Joint Missions for Space and
Cyberspace from JOE 2035.144
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Enduring Military Tasks
Disrupt or degrade to punish aggressive action by an adversary
or to force an adversary to retreat from previous gains [emphasis in original].

Compel or destroy to impose
desired changes to the international security environment and
subsequently enforce those outcomes [emphasis in original].

Space and Cyberspace-Related Missions
Global Commons Defense. . . . the Joint Force
must maintain the ability to conduct targeted
command and control [C2] warfare, counter
ISR operations, and discriminate sensor interdiction and spoofing in all commons. Furthermore, the Joint Force should be capable of responding to the threat of adversaries creating
debris fields in important orbits [emphasis in
original].
Cyberspace Disruption. . . . Additionally,
the Joint Force may conduct proportional
cross-domain operations to physically damage an adversary’s cyber infrastructure, using
weapons operating in other domains to suppress enemy cyber defenses and specifically
strike their critical cyber infrastructure. Furthermore, these operations should be coupled
with defensive cyber efforts to block adversary responses, and might include the use
of autonomous or semi-autonomous cyber
defense systems or the activation of war reserve networks when peacetime networks are
unavailable [emphasis in original].
Global Commons Exclusion. . . . This will likely
include multi-domain offensive operations
using coordinated and simultaneous electronic, cyber, space, and kinetic actions to eradicate adversary capabilities that can influence
or affect the commons [emphasis in original].
Cyberspace Control. . . . Cyberspace control operations will frequently integrate cyber and
non-cyber capabilities. In coordination with
law enforcement agencies, offensive operations may be required to identify, target, and
capture or kill adversary cyber operatives. Offensive operations will also be used to eradicate an adversary’s cyber infrastructure and
capabilities, which might include an array of
kinetic strikes combined with simultaneous
electronic, cyber, and space warfare actions
[emphasis in original].

Table 7. Evolving Joint Missions for Space and
Cyberspace from JOE 2035. (cont.)
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A complete evaluation of JOE 2035 is beyond the
scope of this monograph, but clearly in it the joint staff
foresees military roles and cross-domain operations
for the space and cyberspace domains that far exceed
those of the present day. But is this view shared by
other similar examinations of the future?145
Global Risks 2035
The Atlantic Council report Global Risks 2035: The
Search for a New Normal echoes many of the themes of
the JOE 2035, also through the perspective of changing
demographics, international governance, and technology advancement.146 For the global commons of space,
the commentary envisions increased dependence and
competition for space systems that may tempt state
and nonstate actors to disrupt space operations. Escalation of conflict may occur and:
if an arms race in space does get under way among the
United States, China, Russia, India, Brazil, Japan, and
other countries, these countries are likely to employ
symmetric and asymmetric measures to counter the
threats in space and coming from space.147

The study treats cyberspace issues with more
imminent concern. The author lists the task to “Stop
the slide towards a segmented internet. There is [sic]
needs to be rules governing offensive cyber” as part
of 11 items in a recommended “100-Day Checklist for
the New Administration.”148 From a global commons
framework, the report projects that cybersecurity costs
may eventually outweigh the benefits for advanced
economic countries like the United States.149 From
a domain framework, the author asserts, “Cyber is
now transforming the nature of conflict and war.”150
Expanding on this theme, the study warns against
possible disruption by cyberattacks without warning
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from a variety of state and nonstate actors. However,
the discussion focuses on critical infrastructure attacks
and crime in cyberspace; the report does not address
any roles of cyberspace in warfare.
Implications for the Army and the Joint Force
Anticipated future trends favor the decreased
emphasis on traditional large-scale land operations
and increased frequency and intensity of conflict in
space and cyberspace. What are the implications and
challenges that may result from these trends?
LandCyber
The U.S. Army’s concept for achieving its cross-domain synergy is LandCyber, a transformational convergence of land and CO similar to the U.S. Army’s
AirLand Battle concepts to address challenges in the
European theater in the 1980s. The central idea of
LandCyber is for the U.S. Army to:
think globally and act locally in the cyberspace domain
in conjunction with land forces to shape the physical and
virtual security-related behavior of humans and their
machines to gain opportunity and advantage.151

The path to achieve LandCyber is described in a September 2013 white paper from the Army Cyber Proponent of U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCY)/2nd U.S.
Army. It identifies eight aspects of convergence and
nine guiding principles as the foundation for LandCyber.152 The white paper provides an overview of the
U.S. Army roles and responsibilities in cyberspace that
include C-OPE, critical infrastructure protection, integration into exercises, and CCMD support. It also gives
near, mid, and long-term projections of cyberspace
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evolution.153 Although it discusses emerging CO similar to joint cyberspace doctrine, the LandCyber white
paper lists U.S. Army mission areas as cyberspace
control; cyberspace forces enhancement; cyberspace
support; and cyberspace force application—a mission
set similar to that in joint space doctrine.154 The white
paper includes an insightful discussion of how the
LandCyber capabilities are related to the traditional
warfighting functions.155 Overall, the LandCyber concept adopts an approach that is holistic and forward
leaning in scope.
FM 3-38 appears to embody many of the tenets of
LandCyber, although there the FM contains no reference to the concept. At the conclusion of the research
for this monograph, the highly anticipated U.S. Army
document FM 3-12, Cyberspace and EW Operations, was
not complete.156 Recent status briefings indicate that
FM 3-12 will include fundamentals of cyberspace and
EW operations as well as CEMA considerations. It may
also tackle the issue of addressing the relationships that
cyberspace operations have on space operations, IO,
intelligence, and targeting. Finally, it should include
appendices that cover organization for CO, cyberspace
information required for operations orders, and standard formats for cyber effects or EA requests.157
Joint Force Development
When considering the type of cross-domain operations that the United States may encounter in the near
future, it is important to note that potential adversaries
may be working along similar lines of effort. Although
a detailed exploration of potential adversaries is
beyond the scope of this monograph, the vignette from
the cross-domain Planner’s Guide on Russian actions
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in Georgia (August 2008) captures the realm of the
possible:
The war between Georgia, Russia, and the Russianbacked self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia saw some 35,000-40,000 Russian and allied
forces, augmented by significant air and naval forces,
confront some 12,000-15,000 Georgian forces with little
air and minimal naval capability. Although a short and
limited conflict, it was historic and precedent setting.
This appears to be the first coordinated cyberspace
attacks synchronized with major combat actions in the
other warfighting domains, primarily land and air. . . .
In summary, Russian planners tightly integrated CO
with their kinetic, diplomatic, and strategic messaging
operations. The Russo-Georgian war provides a case
study for joint planners preparing for a future conflict,
involving the new domain of cyberspace.158

The CCJO identifies 23 explicit force development
implications to enable globally integrated operations.
Five of these implications directly address force development required for space and cyberspace forces in
the joint functional areas of C2, fires, movement and
maneuver, and protection (see Table 8). The JOAC
and JCEO provide more detailed force development
goals focused on capabilities to enhance entry operations; these include significant requirements for space
and cyberspace capabilities (see Appendix IV of this
monograph).
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Command and Control:

Enhance our ability to operate effectively in а
degraded environment. Given dramatic increases
in the ability of adversaries to disrupt, degrade or
destroy cyberspace and space systems, it is essential that Joint Forces be able to operate effectively
despite degradation to those systems. Greater resilience must be built in to technical architectures, and
the force must regularly train to operate in “worst
case” degraded environments [emphasis in original].

Fires:

Provide а fire support coordination capability that
integrates all fires, including cyber. Key to maximizing cross-domain synergy will be fielding а system
for planning, requesting and directing all available
fires so any element of а Joint Force can access the
most appropriate supporting arm. In particular,
realizing the global potential of Joint Forces will require that previously niche capabilities, such as offensive cyber weapons, are available to Joint Force
commanders [emphasis in original].

Movement and
Maneuver:

Rapidly employable on а global scale. As а nation
with global responsibilities, the forces of the United
States must be able to operate effectively anywhere
in the world on short notice. This can be achieved
through multiple means. Massed force, deployed to
the scene, is certainly one way. Low-signature and
low-footprint capabilities, such as cyber and global
strike, саn also project force quickly. Versatility, too,
plays а role. Forces suitable for а variety of missions,
if smartly positioned, maximize the chance of being
prepared for а crisis [emphasis in original].

Protection:

Improve cyber defense capabilities. Given the heavy
reliance of Joint Forces on military computer networks and civilian critical infrastructure, it is essential that Joint Forces be able to defend key systems
and ensure the continuity of critical network functions in the face of disruption [emphasis in original].
Continue to improve defensive space capabilities.
Given the heavy reliance of Joint Forces on space
systems and the rapidly increasing proliferation of
counterspace systems, it is essential that Joint Forces
be able to protect friendly space capabilities, including defensive space control and space situational
awareness capabilities [emphasis in original].

Table 8. Force Development Priorities for Space
and Cyberspace from CCJO.159
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The efforts described in Table 8 reflect the premise that space and cyberspace will be hotly contested
domains, and thus their defenses must be improved.
Also, the CCJO makes it clear that other force development efforts should carefully deliberate over their
dependence on space and cyberspace capabilities as
well as ponder how to compensate for disruption of
activities in these domains. Finally, some of these force
development efforts may push beyond the limits of
technical feasibility and affordability.160
Other Operational Challenges
There are several themes of operational challenges
common to many of the documents examined in this
monograph. While beyond the scope herein to explore
these themes, they merit serious study and incorporation into the general dialogue of future joint forces.
Dealing with Disruption. The CCJO and JOE 2035
stress that commanders should be prepared to deal with
disrupted and degraded space and cyberspace capabilities that may be attacked using advanced weapons
(HPRF and EMP). Such disruptions should be studied not only for tactical and operational impacts, but
also for strategic implications. For example, interfering
with certain on-orbit assets, such as GPS and missile
warning satellites, may evoke greater consequences
than the local SATCOM jamming.
Cross-domain Deterrence. The refinement of
cross-domain synergy can help to clarify the intentions
of deterrence measures as well as enhance their effectiveness. The traditional strategic deterrence anchored
with nuclear weapons may evolve to incorporate space
and cyberspace means due to their growing utility and
value.161
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The Leadership Dimension. Concepts such as
LandCyber that are enabled by space and cyberspace means hope to provide unprecedented situational awareness and connectivity at the lowest
echelons. While such a construct offers great promise
for enhancing unified land operations, it also creates
challenges for effective mission command such as the
increased potential for commanders to micromanage
their troops.162
Autonomous Systems. The JOE 2035 addresses
the evolution of autonomous and robotic technologies
and weapon systems. Such capabilities have the potential to enhance joint operations, but they will likely be
used by adversaries as well for applications in the battlespace and against the U.S. homeland.163 For current
operations, the legality and ethics surrounding remotely-operated weapon systems are contentious issues in
international venues such as the UN.164
Electromagnetic Spectrum. Within U.S. military
doctrine, EMS is generally viewed as a critical enabler
to operations in all domains.165 Current U.S. Army
doctrine provides useful codification of EMS within its
CEMA construct. However, the status of EMS within
the body of doctrine remains muddled as do related
terms such as EW and EA.166 Many practitioners and
scholars argue that EMS is worthy of being named as
the sixth warfighting domain; this remains an open
dialogue.167
Recommendations
Physical Limitations in Cyberspace
Time and Distance in Cyberspace. Recommend
that the parameters of time and distance be considered
as significant parameters for CO, and that the transfer
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of information never be characterized as being instantaneous. Rather, they are governed by the laws of physics and, therefore, cyberspace capabilities are affected
by the distance that they traverse (despite to JOAC’s
assertion to the contrary).168 Many large U.S. brokerage
firms have applied this fact to their economic advantage by locating their servers as close as possible to the
Wall Street servers to reduce the transmission times
of their high-speed trading. In addition to the distance traveled, planners should note the existence and
potential effects of “cyberspace weather/traffic” in
the commons that may impede the delivery of “cyber
payloads.” Like terrestrial weather, these phenomena
may be difficult to predict in such cases as the flood
of social media surrounding unforeseen events such as
the death of Michael Jackson or Prince.
Limits of Human Cognition in Cyberspace. Current concepts and doctrine infer that human operations
can exercise effective C2 in the cyberspace domain.
However, much of the activity in cyberspace occurs
at speeds well beyond the human ability to comprehend. Recommend that the joint community add the
realm of “ultra-tactical operations” to the traditional
tactical-operational-strategic spectrum.169 This concept
could also be of great utility for applications of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapon systems.
Command Relationships
USCYBERCOM as CCMD. Recommend that
USCYBERCOM remain as a sub-unified command.
The vision of future operations articulated in the
JOAC and JOE 2035 support the wisdom of consolidating the global-reaching capabilities, such as strategic
nuclear strike, missile defense forces, and cyberspace
forces, under the unified command of USSTRATCOM.
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Historians will recall the push in the late 20th century
for the unified command of space to be elevated to its
own service. Its reduction from CCMD to the JFCC
under USSTRATCOM did not significantly hamper
joint space operations.
Space C2 Structure. Recommend that the next version of JP 3-14, Space Operations, clarify the notional C2
relationships between USSTRATCOM, CCMD and its
service components, and combat support agencies by
adding a diagram and supporting text. Figure IV-1 of
JP 3-12 (R) should serve as the model, thus enhancing
cohesion between the two JPs.
Domain Definitions
Define Domain. Recommend that the DoD and
the joint staff develop an official definition of military
domain. Common usage in joint doctrine may infer the
ability to apply sovereignty or the ability to achieve
dominance or local superiority; or it may merely refer
to physical characteristics. Regardless, theory and
doctrine should include the establishment of precise
language that can eliminate pedantic arguments and
facilitate intellectual dialogue on such topics. The definition could include a set of parameters common in
concept but not in application. For example, domain
parameters such as boundaries, seams with other
domains, and environmental disruptors may be useful
for comparison and enhancing cross-domain operations. Also, representation of land, space, and cyberspace domains should be refined in future versions
of the Cross-Domain Planner’s Guide to address issues
identified in Tables 2 through 4 of this monograph.
Domain versus Commons. In many joint documents the term “commons” (or “global commons”) is
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used interchangeably with certain domains. In addition to codifying a definition for domain, recommend
that the DoD and the joint staff not only provide a definition for commons (or global commons) but also provide discussion for when it is appropriate to use the
term. A starting point may be the JOAC description
of a global commons as “areas of air, sea, space, and
cyberspace that belong to no one state.”170
A suggested distinction to consider and refine is for
“domain” to be used for applications focused on military activities (e.g., organize, train, equip, and operate)
and for “commons” to be used for applications that
explicitly include other instruments of national power
(e.g., diplomatic and economic).
Define the Space Domain. Recommend that the
DoD and the joint staff develop an official definition
for the space domain. Granted, the seam between air
and space domains may not be significant to current
cross-domain operations. However, future space operations may include more routine traversing of vehicles
to and from space as well as more airborne systems
operating at extremely high altitudes.
Discuss Domain-Specific Terrain. Recommend
future versions of domain-specific joint doctrine publications include a discussion on the notion of “key
terrain” in the domain. Such discussion could address
whether the terrain is transient, enduring, or a mixture; how it can be influenced by blue or red forces;
what lines of communication and choke points exist;
and what factors influence movement in and through
the given domain.
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Supported and Supporting Roles
Space and Cyberspace in the Lead. Current joint
doctrine makes mention of the possibility that space or
CO may be designated as the supported activities, but
does not address how this might occur. Recommend
future joint doctrine include examples of how the supporting efforts in traditional domains may support
main efforts in the space or cyberspace domains.
Priorities for Cyberspace Resources. The CCJO
and JOE 2035 set high expectations for future U.S. military cyberspace forces with little regard of the feasibility of these forces to be able to cover all the tasks. In
turn, this may foster unrealistic expectations for U.S.
Government, commercial, and international entities
with regard to the support they may receive for “cyber
resiliency” efforts.171 Recommend that future DoD and
joint staff publications strive to emphasize the high-demand/low-density aspects of cyberspace capabilities
as well as a realistic evaluation of military cyberspace
support outside of military operations during periods
of intense and widespread conflict.
Enduring Military Theory
Discussion of Joint Functions and Principles. Recommend that future versions of joint doctrine publications for domain operations include a brief discussion
on the 12 principles of joint operations as well as the
8 joint functions. This will enhance understanding of
how common theories and principles of military operations apply to specific domains as well as provide a
common lexicon and topics for comparison amongst
domains. The use of vignettes in these discussions may
enhance understanding for the joint community.
Military Theory for Space and Cyberspace.
One can argue that military activities in space and
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cyberspace are the least intuitive to comprehend and
the least understood by military planners and operators. Recommend that the DoD and the joint staff
actively support the development of military theory
to help provide a foundation for increased knowledge
in the joint force. Such efforts should be promulgated
throughout the spectrum of military professional
education.
Summary
By their very nature, military doctrine and operations are works in progress. In general, the current
state of military doctrine in the relatively new domains
of space and cyberspace include adequate means to
support land-based joint operations. However, knowledge of the nature of these new domains is not intu
itive, and understanding their unique characteristics
and capabilities is still a challenge for the military
force writ large. Anticipated future trends favor the
decreased emphasis on traditional large-scale land
operations and increased frequency and intensity of
conflict in space and cyberspace, perhaps even where
these newer domains may become preeminent for
a given operation. The joint staff’s pursuit of achieving cross-domain synergy in planning and operations
offers a credible method to face some of the challenges
of the future joint force, but this will likely remain an
evolutionary vice revolutionary endeavor.
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of computer and telecommunication networks. A significant
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and electromagnetic spectrums [EMS]. [Footnote for this
paragraph: The use of the term cyber-electromagnetic is not
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22)

63 Department of Army, FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of Army, February 2014, p. v. For additional background and history of the U.S.
Army CO, see Jeffrey L. Caton, Army Support of Military Cyberspace
Operations: Joint Contexts and Global Escalation Implications, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2015.
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accessed
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Abstract: The International Telecommunication Union
[herein after: ITU] is the United Nations [UNs] specialized
agency for information and communications technologies,
that allocates global radio spectrum and satellites orbits and
develops the technical standards which ensure that networks
and technologies seamlessly interconnect. [1] As the satellite
industry is the most profitable space business at the moment,
the demand for slots in the geostationary orbit [herein after:
GSO] has been growing and the mandated institution to
allocate these slots amongst States is the ITU. Due to the high
value of the orbital positions and their scarcity, the GSO is
slowly becoming saturated, despite the fact that many States
have not yet placed a satellite into orbit due to technological
or economic constrictions. This impairment of the States in
their capability to participate has triggered a speculative
phenomenon known as ‘overfiling’. Overfiling consists of
registering unneeded uses of orbit resources and has the
effect of foreclosing others, who have near-term needs,
from achieving access and conflict-free registrations. As a
consequence of this practice, some States risk being denied
their right to use outer space freely, a right which has been
generally recognized in the international space legislation.

83 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), p. 52. Table TIV-2
of the Planner’s Guide is taken from Table 1 of Sean Brandes, “The
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1-13. Cyberspace has characteristics that significantly differ
from the land, air, maritime, and space domains. Cyberspace
is a system of systems in that many small and diverse systems
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throughout each of the four natural domains. Changes in
cyberspace are often driven by private industry research and
development, making the domain dynamic and continually
evolving as information technology capabilities continue
to expand and evolve. Because cyberspace is man-made, it
is only through continued attention and maintenance that
cyberspace persists.
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1-14. Cyberspace reinforces the fact that an operational
framework is not confined to a physical place. Traditional
battlefields were confined to physical space. While the
repercussions of what happens on the traditional battlefield
can create social and political effects around the world, the
actual physical impact is limited to the physical battlefield.
The inclusion of cyberspace and the EMS greatly expands
and complicates the operational framework, transforming a
limited physical battlefield to a global battlefield. A computer
virus executed in cyberspace may strike its intended target
and also indiscriminately strike other systems in several
nations around the world, including the United States (U.S.).
Collateral damage from this type of attack is not always
predictable.
1-15. Cyberspace is an environment created and maintained
for the purpose of facilitating the use and exploitation of
information, human interaction, and intercommunication.
This domain co-exists with the EMS through
telecommunications systems. These systems utilize the EMS
and have converged into a worldwide network to create
cyberspace. Effective CO holistically address the physical
infrastructure, data networks, and the EMS.
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original].
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97 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 1-5.
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104 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. IV-18.
105 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 1-5.
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107 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), p. I-2.
108 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. IV-18.
109 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 1-5.
110 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), p. IV-12.
111 Ibid., p. II-1.
112 Department of the Army, ADP No. 3-0, p. 13. Mission
Command is described as:
62. The mission command warfighting function develops
and integrates those activities enabling a commander to
balance the art of command and the science of control.
This fundamental philosophy of command places people,
rather than technology or systems, at the center. Under
this philosophy, commanders drive the operations process
through their activities of understand, visualize, describe,
direct, lead, and assess.

68

113 For details, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. B-2, Figure
B-1 “Missile Warning and Support Request Procedures.”
114 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 3-12. The Cyberspace
Effects Request Form is described as follows:
3-50. The cyber effects request format is a format used to
request effects in support of CO. The cyber effects request
format contains baseline information for coordinating and
integrating cyberspace capabilities and associated authorities
to create effects outside and inside of the DODIN including
LandWarNet. Commanders and staffs ensure cyber effects
request formats are developed and submitted throughout
the operations process to facilitate planning. Also, the
cyber effects request format facilitates the achievement
of operational and tactical objectives by leveraging the
employment of cyberspace capabilities.

115 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02D,
Guidance for Development and Implementation of Joint Concepts,
Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 22, 2013, p. A-3.
While concepts indirectly guide the other elements of
force development, the relationship between concepts and
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ideas for how the Joint Force should operate. As concepts
gain institutional acceptance and requisite capabilities
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116 DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Version
1.0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17,
2012, Foreword, available from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf, accessed November 3, 2016.
117 Ibid., Foreword.
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[emphasis in original]” resulting from decreased support abroad,
severely contracting resources, and force protection.

69

119 Ibid., p. 12.
120 Ibid., p. 26.
121 Ibid., p. 27. The JOAC vision includes the use of traditional domain forces to support space and CO:
Gaining space and cyberspace superiority when and where
needed is not necessarily a symmetrical effort—that is,
cyberspace operations [CO] to gain cyberspace superiority
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Since operational access does not exist for its own sake, joint
forces should conduct access operations in accordance with
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other elements of national power. Importantly, a joint force
commander [JFC] should avoid over-committing forces or
projecting combat power deeper into hostile territory than is
required by the objective. This is especially true of major land
forces, which can be difficult to withdraw once committed.

123 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
124 Ibid., p. 22.
125 Ibid., pp. 19-20. Operational Access Precept number 3,
“Consider a variety of basing options [emphasis in original],”
includes use of space and cyberspace capabilities to help offset
forward-based forces:
One other option is to emphasize capabilities with minimal
dependence on forward bases, such as amphibious, longrange strike, cyber, electronic, or space capabilities, either in
primary or supporting roles.

126 Ibid., pp. 18-19. Operational Access Precept number 2,
“Prepare the operational area in advance to facilitate access
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[emphasis in original],” emphasizes the early use of operations in
the space and cyberspace domains:
Operations in space, cyberspace, and across the
electromagnetic spectrum [EMS] likewise will be continuous
to ensure that support to navigation, command and control
[C2], targeting, sustainment, and intelligence are in place
when needed. Moreover, computer network operations
[NETOPS], both offensive and defensive, likely will
commence long before lethal combat begins and even before
combat forces begin to deploy.

Operational Access Precept number 5, “Exploit advantages in
one or more domains to disrupt enemy antiaccess/area-denial
capabilities in others [emphasis in original],” (pp. 21-22) also
calls early space and CO:
The decision on which domains to operate in initially will
depend on the mission and the enemy’s capabilities and
vulnerabilities in the various domains; there is no universal
sequence. That said, joint force projection almost always will
include the early conduct of information operations [IO]
and operations in space and cyberspace, since freedom of
action in those latter domains is increasingly important to all
joint operations. Moreover, those operations rarely require
the additional risks incurred in deploying forces to the
operational area. In fact, information, space, and cyberspace
operations [CO] generally should commence well before the
need for combat, as part of efforts to shape the operational
area.

127 Ibid., p. 25. Operational Access Precept number 10, “Maximize surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity to
complicate enemy targeting [emphasis in original],” includes:
In the context of future opposed access, forms of deception
that could prove especially useful include electromagnetic
deception and cyber deception, which could provide
intentionally erroneous information on the location and
activities of deploying joint forces to enemy intelligence
networks.

128 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Entry Operations,
Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2014, p. iii, available
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from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/jceo
.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162000-837, accessed February 13, 2018.
129 Ibid., p. vi. The purpose of the Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO) is summarized in this passage as:
The idea is to employ opportunistic, unpredictable
maneuver, in and across multiple domains, in conjunction
with the ability to attain local superiority at multiple entry
points to gain entry and achieve desired objectives.

130 Ibid., p. vii.
131 Ibid., p. 6. The other six operational characteristics are:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Purposes for entry operations
Geographic and infrastructure challenges
Capacity for entry operations
Evolving threats
Whole-of-government approach
Multinational and coalition interface and interoperability

132 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
133 Ibid., pp. 12-13. Regarding the use of cyberspace and
space to support military deception (MILDEC) operations against
enemy forces, the JCEO includes:
One method the Joint Force may use to confound the enemy
is to create either a dearth or overabundance of targets for
the enemy to process. Social media and other cyber-enabled
deception methods may be valuable contributors to gaining
surprise. Where surprise is not possible due to the nature
of the operating area or the duration of the operation, the
Joint Force will seek to overwhelm the enemy’s targeting
capability. This could be done, for example, through a
combination of cyberspace efforts and the use of numerous
autonomous decoys employed in one or more of the other
domains.

Regarding the use of cyberspace and space support of MILDEC
operation to reduce collateral damage, the JCEO states:
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Additionally, information operations, [IO] including those
enabled by cyberspace employed in either a clandestine or
overt manner, may be able to move populations away from
potential points of entry in order to minimize collateral
damage concerns.

134 Ibid., pp. 13, 15. With regard to joint fires, the JCEO
suggests:
In a hostile environment, fires will be mutually supporting
across all domains to develop local superiority by
suppressing threats to air and maritime operations. For
example, information operations [IO], cyberspace, and
space operations may be used to help a special operations
unit to target, track, and conduct a direct action strike on an
adversary’s anti-ship system, permitting naval surface fires
to engage enemy air defense assets. In turn, this engagement
would allow global strike assets to eliminate key short range
area denial assets that would otherwise impede the entry
force.

135 Ibid., p. 20. The JCEO notes how maneuver is enhanced
by space and cyberspace capabilities:
Regardless of the type of maneuver, mobility and flexibility
are critical and enhanced when fully integrated with
cyberspace and space capabilities. Entry operations require
the ability to build up capabilities as quickly as possible.
Forces must be able to disperse to seize key terrain or for
self-preservation, and to concentrate rapidly to exploit
opportunity.

136 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Environment, JOE 2035:
The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World, Washington, DC:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 14, 2016, p. 7, available from http://www.
jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joe_2035_july16.
pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917, accessed September 19, 2016. The
Joint Operating Environment (JOE) suggests regional power trends
that include:
Emergence of new spacefaring nations and military
competition in space. Many capabilities previously
reserved to superpowers are now available to other states
on a commercial basis, to include Earth observation, optical
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sensing, space-based Internet, and communications services.
A range of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) able to disrupt or
destroy the space, electromagnetic, and ground segments of
these constellations will also become more common.
Growth of state-sponsored cyber forces and capabilities.
The next decades will see the further emergence of statesponsored actors and associated organizations with more
advanced cyber warfare capabilities. Like strategic airpower
before it, state-based cyber advocates will develop strategies
that attempt to “leap over” traditional U.S. military forces
and directly influence the decision calculations of political
and military leadership.

137 Ibid., p. 17.
138 Ibid., pp. 21, 30-33.
139 Ibid., pp. 30, 33.
140 Ibid., pp. 32-33. JOE 2035 predicts a potentially hostile
space domain:
Competition in orbit (even during peacetime) will be
intense, highlighted by satellites maneuvering to hinder
the operations of other satellites, co-orbital jamming, and
the use of ground-based lasers to dazzle or destroy imaging
sensors. Future adversaries will also have the capability to
deploy blockers and grapplers to impede the free operation
of commercial and military satellites, and they will use
ASAT weapons launched at space assets from the ground as
well as from other satellites. Ultimately, this may generate
space debris leading to a runaway chain reaction which
destroys other satellites and threatens the integrity of many
important orbits.

141 Ibid., p. 34.
142 Ibid., p. 35. The context of conflict in cyberspace includes:
A growing number of states will have extensive offensive
cyber forces at their disposal to disrupt the smooth and
efficient functioning of cyber-connected systems. In the
future, state military and security organizations will
increasingly use cross-border network and web-site
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disruptions to cause social unrest. Attacks will work to
undermine the trust and data integrity that are central to
advanced societies, particularly financial, legal, and technical
infrastructure. This competition may also feature strategic
surveillance as well as industrial and scientific espionage.

143 Ibid., p. 36.
144 Ibid., pp. 40-50.
145 For additional reports on future security environments,
see National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, Report NIC 2012-001, Washington, DC: Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, available from https://www.dni.
gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf, accessed November 18,
2016. For additional views on the need for space and cyberspace
capabilities to address increasing anti-access/area denial (A2/
AD) challenges, see Jason D. Ellis, Seizing the Initiative: Competitive
Strategies and Modern U.S. Defense Policy, Report LLNL-TR-680128,
Livermore CA: Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 2016, available from https://
cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/J_Ellis_Seizing_the_Initiative_1_16.
pdf, accessed November 18, 2016. To explore challenges presented
by China’s increased military forces, see Peter Dombrowski,
America’s Third Offset Strategy: New Military Technologies and Implications for the Asia Pacific, Policy Report, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, June 2015, available from https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/PR150608_Americas-Third-Offset-Strategy.pdf,
accessed November 18, 2016.
146 Mathew J. Burrrows, Global Risks 2035: The Search for a
New Normal, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, September 2016,
available from http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/
global-risks-2035, accessed October 6, 2016. The report is organized
into nine chapters that address changing demographics, international governance, and technology advancement: Ch. 1. Individual Empowerment with More Unintended Consequences; Ch. 2.
Growing Demographic Crunch for Everybody Except Sub-Saharan Africa; Ch. 3. A Malthusian World of Scarcities Increasingly
Likely for the Poorest; Ch. 4. Technology with Downsides; Ch.
5. Conflict Risk Increasing; Ch. 6. Middles East: High Risk of
Continuing Conflict; Ch. 7. China’s linchpin in the Global Order;
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Ch. 8. The Difficult Transition to a Post-Western Order; and,
Ch. 9. The Big Picture.
147 Ibid., p. 40. Regarding a future contested space environment, the report projects that:
The space powers will continue to develop quantitative and
qualitative space-based missile attack early warning systems,
intelligence, navigation, communications and broadcasting,
and military command-and-control systems.
The likelihood of space incidents (such as the collision
of Russian and US satellites in 2009) might increase. Such
incidents also include the possibility that authoritarian and
irresponsible regimes will attempt to disrupt the operation
of space systems, with unpredictable socioeconomic and
military consequences.
The only way to prevent an arms race in space would be to
improve the legal basis for activity in outer space, particularly
by expanding restrictions and bans on weapons deployment
in orbit and development of land-, air-, and sea-based means
of destroying objects in space.

148 Ibid., p. ii.
149 Ibid., p. 8. The original source of this information was
cited as Atlantic Council, Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, and Zurich, Risk Nexus: Overcome by Cyber Risks?
Economic Benefits and Costs of Alternate Cyber Futures, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, September 2015, available from http://
publications.atlanticcouncil.org/cyberrisks//risk-nexus-september2015-overcome-by-cyber-risks.pdf, accessed November 4, 2016. The
original reports consider this cost-benefit inflection to be an ongoing global phenomena:
A future where the annual costs of being connected
outweigh the benefits is not only possible, it is happening
now. According to our project models, annual cybersecurity
costs in high-income economies like the U.S. have already
begun to outweigh the annual economic benefits arising
from global connectivity.
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For all economies, the inversion of costs and benefits
is expected to occur within the next five years. In Latin
America, it is expected before the year 2030, as the region
bridges the digital divide. In the Asia-Pacific region, the
inversion is expected sometime after that. (p. 2)

150 Burrrows, p. 29.
151 Army Cyber Proponent, The U.S. Army LandCyber White
Paper 2018-2030, Fort George G. Meade, MD: U.S. Army Cyber
Command/2nd U.S. Army, September 9, 2013, p. 9, available
from http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a592724.pdf, accessed November 6, 2013.
152 Ibid., p. viii. The foundation of the LandCyber concept
includes:
Eight Aspects of Convergence:
1. Time and space
2. Threat and technology
3. Land and cyber domains
4. Cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum [EMS]
5. Defensive and offensive cyber
operations
6. Information environment and
cyberspace domain
7. Information management and
knowledge management
8. Operational and institutional

Nine Guiding Principles:
1. Unified cyberspace operations
[CO]
2. Integration
3. Localized cyberspace effects
to the tactical edge
4. Enhanced understanding
5. All networks are operational
warfighting platforms and
functions
6. Combined arms approach
7. Achieve cyberspace domain
superiority
8. Ensure mission command
9. Empowered LandCyber units
and Soldiers

153 Ibid., p. 4-6. Per the white paper, the following are the
Army’s roles and responsibilities in cyberspace as an operating
force:
(1) Support prevent, shape, and win roles with cyberspace
capabilities. This requires supporting intelligence operations
and conducting cyberspace operational preparation of the
environment (OPE) [sic] to plan and prepare for military
operations. Building, operating and defending all Army
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networks as an end-to-end enterprise ensures its availability
to the Army.
(2) Provide critical infrastructure protection for the Army
and U.S. Northern Command national systems, and provide
Army-wide indications and warning against threats and
attacks.
(3) Integrate cyberspace operations [CO] capabilities into
joint and Army planning and exercises, facilitate security
cooperation to create defense in depth (under the direction
of COCOMs [combatant command-command authority]
and subject to the limitations of National Foreign Disclosure
Policy), develop shared indications and warning, and
leverage combined cyberspace operations [CO] strengths.
Plan and integrate world-class cyber opposing forces
(WCCO) in concert with USCYBERCOM and provide
representative adversary command, control, and networked
systems into training, testing, experiments, and exercises.
This integration develops Army forces that can detect
and respond to adversary cyber attacks and operate in a
degraded cyberspace environment.
(4) Integrate cyberspace operations [CO] into combatant
command [CCMD] planning and targeting processes
to broaden the range of options. Deliver offensive and
defensive cyber effects, if approved and directed, planned
and integrated through cyber electromagnetic activities
(CEMA). Conduct information operations (IO) in or through
the cyberspace domain for the Army and support inform
and influence activities (IIA) in or through the cyberspace
domain.

154 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
155 Ibid., pp. 17-22.
156 The new version of FM 3-12 was released 5 months after
the research for this monograph was concluded. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-12.
157 Malcom Martin, “Cyber Support to Corps and Below –
Concepts and Doctrine,” briefing at the TechNet Augusta 2016
conference sponsored by the Armed Forces Communications
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and Electronics Association, Fort Gordon, GA: U.S. Army Cyber
Center of Excellence, August 2, 2016.
158 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), p. 4.
159 The excerpts in Table 8 are verbatim from Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, pp. 8-12.
160 Ibid., p. 14. The CCJO addresses the practical realities of
force development:
The pursuit of advanced technology may prove unaffordable.
This concept envisions Joint Forces enabled by advanced
technologies in global communications, networked
operations, space, cyberspace, robotics, platforms and lift.
Such technologies, especially in а time of restricted budgets,
may prove prohibitively expensive to develop and deploy.

161 See R. J. Vince, “Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar Summary Notes,” report LLNL-ABS-670206, Livermore CA: Center for
Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1, 2015, p. 2, available from https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/
assets/docs/SummaryNotes.pdf, accessed November 18, 2016. This
report defines cross-domain deterrence as:
The act of deterring an action in one domain with a threat
in another domain, where the domains are defined as land,
under the land, at sea, under the sea, in the air, in space, and
in cyberspace, and may use economic sanctions and other
diplomatic and political tools.

162 See John L. Rafferty, Jr., LandCyber Operations: A Double
Edged Sword or a Dream Team? Strategy Research Project, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2013, abstract, this
Strategy Research Project explores the questions: “Will LandCyber enable micro-managing leaders to be the ‘wet blanket’ of
mission command? Or will it open new doors for more effective
maneuver and influence operations?”
163 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOE 2035, pp. 17-20, 26-27. Regarding
potential adversary use of autonomous systems, the JOE notes:
The development of small, smart, cheap, autonomous, longrange, and highly-capable systems operating in the air, land,
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sea, and undersea environments may further complicate the
homeland defense mission by providing relatively cheap
strategic attack options to both state and non-state actors.
(pp. 26-27)

164 See Jeffrey L. Caton, Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Brief
Survey of Development, Operational, Legal, and Ethical Issues, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
December 2015.
165 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), pp. 46, 52. For
details of the space and cyberspace references to EMS, see Tables
3 and 4 of this monograph.
166 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), p. IV-9. An example of
a potentially confusing interaction between cyberspace, space,
EMS, and EA [electronic attack]:
Planners should maintain awareness of the EMS and its
impact on mobile devices and wireless networks, including
cellular, wireless local area network, Global Positioning
System, and other commercial and military uses of the EMS.
CO and EA, to include offensive space control, must be
deconflicted. Uncoordinated EA may significantly impact
OCO utilizing the EMS. Depending upon power levels, the
terrain in which they are used, and the nature of the system
being targeted, unintended effects of EA can also occur
outside of a local commander’s AOR just as second order
effects of CO may occur outside the AOR.

167 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “DoD CIO Says Spectrum May
Become Warfighting Domain,” Breaking Defense, December 9,
2015, available from https://breakingdefense.com/2015/12/dod-ciosays-spectrum-may-become-warfighting-domain/, accessed October
28, 2016. The article includes the text of a statement by DoD Chief
Information Officer (CIO) Terry Halvorsen:
The Department understands that EMS Superiority is a
crucial enabler to achieving superiority in all other domains
and must be considered a prerequisite to all successful
operations. In response to the pressing need to implement
both the DoD EMS Strategy and JCEMSO [Joint Concept
for Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations], the Department
has taken steps that strive to establish policy and assign
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responsibilities to achieve EMS Superiority through efficient
and effective Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO),
which will enable the optimization of EMS access and use/
maneuver throughout the full range of military operations,
and defines EMSO as all spectrum dependent (SD) activities
occurring within the EMS.
As part of this guidance, the Department will investigate all
requirements and ramifications of its enactment, to include
the potential recognition of the EMS as a domain. As the EMS
transcends all domains the Department must systematically
evolve its capabilities to ensure effective EMS operations. As
the Primary Staff Assistant (PSA) to the Secretary of Defense
for spectrum, the Office of the DoD Chief Information Officer
(CIO) will be the Departmental lead for these efforts in close
cooperation and coordination with the all appropriate DoD
Components.

Also, see Martin C. Libicki, “Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting
Domain,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society,
Vol. 8, No. 2, Fall 2012, pp. 325-340, available from https://www.
rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP51077.html, accessed October 28, 2016. Libicki states that the argument for cyberspace as a
domain should also apply to EMS. (p. 366)
168 DoD, JOAC, p. 7. The JOAC inaccurately asserts that
“Advances in airpower and long-range weapons have mitigated
the degrading effects of distance to some extent but have not eliminated them, while cyber capabilities are unaffected by distance.”
169 For details on the concept of ultra-tactical operations,
see Jeffrey L. Caton, “Complexity and Emergence in Ultra-Tactical Cyberspace Operations,” in Karlis Podins, Jan Stinissen, and
Markus Maybaum, eds., Proceeding of 5th International Conference
in Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, Estonia: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence Publications, June 2013, pp. 299-312.
170 DoD, JOAC, p. 1.
171 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOE 2035, p. 43. With regard to cyber
resiliency, JOE 2035 includes:
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The future security environment will continue to feature a
range of adversaries attempting to shape political behavior
by conducting damaging or disruptive cyber-attacks. The
Joint Force must minimize the consequences of threatened
or successful cyberattacks against the United States, its
allies, and partners by conducting Military Support to Cyber
Resiliency. Furthermore, the Joint Force should develop the
capacity to work with a range of nontraditional partners such
as private companies or cyber activists to offset adversary
operations in cyberspace, for example, by identifying and
interdicting adversary cyber operatives.
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ACRONYMS
A2/AD

anti-access/area denial

ADCON

administrative control

ADP

Army Doctrine Publication

AFCY

Air Forces Cyber Command

AOR

area of responsibility

ARCY

Army Cyber Command

ASAT

anti-satellite weapons

C2

command and control

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear

CCDR

combatant commander

CCJO

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

CCMD

combatant command

CCP

Concept Capability Plan

CDRUSSTRATCOM

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

CEMA

cyber electromagnetic activities

CF

Conventional Forces

CIKR

critical infrastructure and key resources

CIO

chief information officer

CO

cyberspace operations

COCOM

combatant command-command
authority

C-OPE

cyberspace operational preparation of
the environment

CSE

cyberspace support element

CyEM

cyber enterprise management

DAL

defended asset list

DCO

defensive cyberspace operations or
defensive CO

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DISA

Defense Information Systems Agency

DNC

DISA network center
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DoD

Department of Defense

DODIN

DoD Information Network

EA

electronic attack

EMP

electromagnetic pulse

EMS

electromagnetic spectrum

EMSO

electromagnetic spectrum operations

EW

electronic warfare

FLTCY

Fleet Cyber Command

FM

Field Manual

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GCC

geographic combatant commander

GIG

global information grid

GPS

global positioning system

GSO

geostationary orbit

HPRF

high-powered radio frequency

IADS

integrated air defense systems

IIA

inform and influence activities

IO

information operations

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance

ITU

International Telecommunication Union

JCC

Joint Cyberspace Center

JCEMSO

Joint Concept for Electromagnetic
Spectrum Operations

JCEO

Joint Concept for Entry Operations

JFC

joint force commander

JFCC SPACE

Joint Functional Component
Commander for Space

JFLCC

joint force land component commander

JNCC

joint network operations control center

JOAC

Joint Operational Access Concept

JOE

Joint Operating Environment

JOPP

joint operation planning process
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JP

Joint Publication

MAR4CY

Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace
Command

MILDEC

military deception

MISO

military information support operations

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVWAR

navigation warfare

NETOPS

network operations

NGA

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NOSC

network operations and security center

NSA

National Security Agency

OCO

offensive CO

OE

operational environment

OPCON

operational control

OPE

operational preparation of the
environment

PED

processing, exploitation, and
dissemination

PNT

position-navigation-timing

PSA

primary staff assistant

SAM

surface-to-air missiles

SATCOM

satellite communications

SCA

space coordinating authority

SD

spectrum dependent

SOF

Special Operations Forces

SSE

space support element

STO

special technical operations

TACON

tactical control

TNC

theater network center

TNCC

theater network coordination center

TRADOC

Training and Doctrine Command

UCP

Unified Command Plan

UN

United Nations
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USCYBERCOM

U.S. Cyber Command

USSPACECOM

U.S. Space Command

USSTRATCOM

U.S. Strategic Command

WCCO

world-class cyber opposing forces

WMD

weapons of mass destruction
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APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF SPACE- AND
CYBERSPACE-RELATED EXCERPTS FROM
JOINT PUBLICATION (JP) 3-31
JP 3-31 excerpts related to the space domain.
2. Joint Land Operations
f. It is important to understand that in today’s complex operational environment [OE], adversary actions can be delivered on, from, within, and outside
of the operational area, all with potentially global impacts and influence. To
negate those threats, commanders at all levels should consider how space, cyberspace, and EMS [electromagnetic spectrum] capabilities enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land operations. Furthermore, joint staffs should
seek out experts who and capabilities that can enhance the effectiveness of land
operations.1
2. Roles and Responsibility
u. Performing the duties of the space coordinating authority (SCA), if
designated. The individual designated to be the JFLCC [joint force land component commander] may also be designated to be the SCA within a joint force
to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. The SCA
has primary responsibility for joint space operations planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force. The SCA gathers operational
requirements that may be satisfied by space capabilities and facilitates the use
of established processes by joint force staffs to plan and conduct space operations.2
8. Command and Control [C2]
f. Space Capabilities for C2
(1) Space systems may be employed to monitor land areas before
friendly forces are established. If the individual designated to be the JFLCC is
also designated to be the SCA, he will normally designate a senior space officer
who facilitates coordination, integration, and staffing activities for space operations on a daily basis.
(2) Space systems provide ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]; missile tracking; launch detection; environmental monitoring;
satellite communications [SATCOM]; position, navigation, and timing; and
navigation warfare [NAVWAR]. Considering the difficulties in communications in and around land areas, space systems offers the JFLCC the ability to
exchange information inside the operational area, between elements of the joint
force, and also facilitates intertheater and intratheater communications. Space
systems may form a critical link in the C2 architecture that rapidly passes data
and information. This can enable taskings and warnings to forces, as well as
critical situational awareness and location information. Space systems face simultaneous demands from many users and require prioritization.
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(3) The space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) provides a critical capability during joint land operations. GPS can provide position, location,
and velocity for weapon accuracy, ingress and egress, location, silent rendezvous coordination, and improved personnel situational awareness. The ability
of space systems to provide real time terrain information that, enhanced by imagery data, can be used by all components of the joint force is especially crucial
to the success of ground forces.3
11. Movement and Manuever
c. The JFLCC makes recommendations to the JFC [joint force commander] on the following:
(9) Space support to the land force.4
Figure A-4. Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Directorate.5
JP 3-31 excerpts related to the cyberspace domain.
2. Joint Land Operations
a. In the 20th century, joint and multinational operations have encompassed the full diversity of air, land, maritime, and space forces operating
throughout the operational area. Advances in capabilities among all forces
and the ability to communicate over great distances have made the application
of military power in the 21st century more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate joint land operations with other components’ operations. Many of these advances have been realized through the
use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which has enabled
the US military and allies to communicate and reach across geographic and
geopolitical boundaries. However, these advances have also led to increased
vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace and the EMS for the
US and its allies.6
f. [see excerpt in space domain section above in this table.]
2. Roles and Responsibility
p. Integrating cyberspace operations (CO) into plans. Offensive cyberspace operations [OCO] will typically be conducted in direct support of the
JFC. The JFLCC conducts defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) and DODIN
[DoD Information Network] operations throughout all phases of the operation.7
Figure II-5. Joint Force Land Component Commander [JFLCC] Interface with
Other Joint Force Command and Control [C2] Mechanisms [This figure includes the following information about CO].8
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C2 Mechanism

Role/Function

JFLCC Interface

JFC’s Joint Cyberspace
Center [JCC]

Combines input from United
States Cyber Command and
combatant commands [CCMD]
to provide a regional/functional
cyberspace situation awareness/
common operational picture.
Facilitates the coordination and
deconfliction of combatant commander [CCDR] directed cyberspace operations [CO].

JFLCC’s representative participates to provide/request cyberspace operations [CO] products.

11. Cross-Functional Staff Organizations
c. Operations
(4) The IO [information operations] cell and cyberspace support element [CSE] works with the JFLCC and key components of the JFLCC’s staff to
determine the cyberspace component of the JFLCC’s defended asset list (DAL).
Once the DAL has been determined, the IO cell and cyberspace support element [CSE] focuses available capabilities to safeguard DAL assets.9
14. Communications Support Systems
The CCDR, through the JFC and functional/service components, ensures
effective, reliable, and secure communications system and cyberspace defense
services are consistent with the overall joint campaign plan. As driven by the
mission, the foundation of the communications system is laid by the C2 organization of forces assigned to the JFC.10
Figure III-1. Joint Force Land Component Commander [JFLCC] Joint Planning Group Representation.11
8. Command and Control [C2]
e. Communications.
(2) Joint network operations (NETOPS) are the means by which
communications are established and maintained throughout the DODIN.
Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) is
the supported commander for global CO to secure, operate, and defend DODIN. CDRUSSTRATCOM cyberspace efforts are coordinated by US Cyber
Command who in turn coordinates with the GCC [geographic combatant commander] at the GCC’s joint cyberspace center [JCC]. As the JFLCC’s single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network, the joint network operations control center (JNCC) must be
knowledgeable concerning the requirements of communications in the land
environment, especially in the specific operational area. The JNCC should be
aware of the capabilities present in the urban area, their potential use, and any
problems associated with that use. Vital to communications management is the
need to support planning and execution to include information exchange requirements, radio frequency spectrum allocation, communications equipment
dispersion, and assessment of communications effectiveness.12
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12. Protection
h. DODIN Operations and DCO. DODIN operations are operations to
design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain DOD [Department of Defense] networks to create and preserve information assurance on the
DODIN, and DCO are passive and active CO intended to preserve the ability
to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect DOD data, networks, and
capabilities and other designated systems.13
15. Cyberspace Operations [CO]
CO are conducted across the range of military operations and CO capabilities should be considered during JOPP [joint operation planning process],
integrated into plans, and synchronized with other operations during execution. Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace,
accomplish objectives, deny freedom of action to adversaries, and enable other
operational activities. The importance of CO support in all military operations
has grown as the joint force increasingly relies on cyberspace for C2 and other
critical operations and logistics functions.14
Figure A-4. Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Directorate.15
8. Communications Systems Staff Section
The J-6 staff coordinates voice, video, data, and message connectivity,
cyberspace defense, and DODIN operations supporting JFLCC operations,
and gives needed guidance to ensure synchronization between all components
and/or subordinate commands. A notional J-6 staff organization is depicted in
Figure A-7. The following actions are the responsibility of the J-6:
aa. Conducts information assurance and NETOPS as part of cyberspace
defense support of JFLCC networks.
ee. Develops a list of critical cyberspace assets so that they can be properly protected to support JFLCC operations.16
5. Command and Control [C2]
b. Communications Systems (annex K). Communications and cyberspace
defense procedures and priorities such as location of key nodes, spectrum management, communications-electronics operating instructions, codes, and interface with joint or multinational forces.17
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1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-31, Command
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APPENDIX II: CYBERSPACE COMMAND AND
CONTROL ORGANIZATIONAL
CONSTRUCT PER JOINT PUBLICATION 3-12 (R)1
Cyberspace Command and Control Organizational Construct
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1. Image modified from “Figure IV-1. Cyberspace Command
and Control Organization Construct,” in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Publication (JP) 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations, Washington, DC:
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, original release February 5, 2013, updated
(unclassified) October 21, 2014, p. IV-8, available from http://www.
jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_12R.pdf, accessed
February 14, 2018.
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APPENDIX III: CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC
ACTIVITIES CONSTRUCT PER
FIELD MANUAL 3-381

ENDNOTES – APPENDIX III
1. Image from “Figure 1-1. Cyber electromagnetic activities,”
in Department of Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department
of Army, February 2014, p. 1-2.
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APPENDIX IV: SUMMARY OF SPACE- AND
CYBERSPACE-RELATED FORCE DEVELOPMENT
REQUIREMENTS FROM SELECTED JOINT
CONCEPT DOCUMENTS

Excerpts from Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)1
Command and
Control [C2]

JOA-004. The ability to integrate cross-domain operations, to include at lower echelons, with the full
integration of space and cyberspace operations [CO].

Intelligence

JOA-006. The ability of operational forces to detect
and respond to hostile computer network attack in
an opposed access situation.

Fires

JOA-011. The ability to conduct electronic attack
[EA] and computer network attack against hostile
antiaccess/area-denial [A2/AD] capabilities.

Movement and
Maneuver

JOA-014. The ability to “maneuver” in cyberspace to
gain entry into hostile digital networks.

Protection

JOA-022. The ability to protect friendly space forces
while disrupting enemy space operations.
JOA-023. The ability to conduct cyber defense in the
context of opposed access.

Excerpts from Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO)2
Command and
Control [C2]

Required Capability 3: The ability to command and
control [C2] forces in austere or degraded environments, including communications, intelligence, cyberspace and space force enhancement degraded
environments.
b. 
Develop procedures for operating without
some or all Space Force Enhancement capabilities (combat support operations and force
multiplying capabilities delivered from space)
or with degraded capabilities for extended periods. Space Force Enhancement capabilities
may include ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance], launch detection, missile tracking, environmental monitoring, satellite communications (SATCOM), and position-navigation-timing capabilities (PNT).
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c. 
The ability to maintain operational access to
key portions of the electro-magnetic spectrum
during entry operations.
d. Develop procedures for rapidly identifying, operating during, and recovering from significant
cyberspace attacks. Effects of some attacks, such
as denial of service, may be more obvious than
others.
f. The ability to provide operationally responsive
space capabilities to augment or reconstitute existing space capabilities.

Required Capability 4: The ability to execute effective and complementary Special Operations Forces
(SOF) and Conventional Forces (CF) integration,
where SOF or CF can be the supported force (depending on the nature of the entry operation).
e. 
Consider expanding the integration and synchronization of space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare [EW] capabilities that CF and SOF
units can leverage across the spectrum of operations.
Intelligence

Required Capability 7: The ability to provide Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) intelligence capabilities in degraded or austere environments during entry operations.
a. Space-enhancement based and reachback PED
capabilities must be able to support or be augmented in order to sufficiently meet entry operations’ intelligence requirements en route,
during initial entry, and even under degraded
or austere conditions.
b. When space-based and reachback support is interdicted, entry forces must be able to carry with
themselves tailored PED capabilities sufficient
to support intelligence requirements in such
communications denied environments.
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c. Ensure all data dissemination methods and
voice communications required by PED activities are sufficiently interoperable between services and allocated with sufficient redundancies
to ensure continuation of data dissemination
in contested environments, including loss of
space-enhancement or reduced access to the
electromagnetic spectrum [EMS].
Fires

Required Capability 10: The ability to continue to
operate against A2/AD threats such as increasingly capable enemy subsurface and surface maritime
threats, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and integrated air defense systems (IADS) capabilities, precision
guided ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles,
small boat swarms, landmines and maritime mines,
complex obstacles, WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and related CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials, and enemy aerial
systems.
c. The ability to deny an enemy’s access to space.
d. The ability to create denial effects within an enemy’s networks.
e. T
 he ability to fully integrate offensive, reactive,
and defensive cyberspace capabilities to protect
and project force in support of entry operations.
f. 
Ensure the joint force has the mechanism to
employ appropriately delegated authority to
use all non-kinetic fires assets, to include cyberspace capabilities.

ENDNOTES – APPENDIX IV
1. DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Version
1.0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17,
2012, pp. 33-35, available from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf, accessed November 3, 2016.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Entry Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2014, pp. 23-33, available
from
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/
jceo.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162000-837, accessed February 13, 2018.
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